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Subtyping Psychopathy: Exploring the Roles of Degree of Punishment,
Cognitive Dissonance and Optimism
John M. Weir
ABSTRACT
For over half of a century, social and behavioral scientists have been investigating
the construct of psychopathy. Even so, psychopathy is still a highly misunderstood
personality construct. Even though it has been estimated that psychopaths make up only
about 1% of the general population, they are believed to consist of 15-25% of the prison
population (Hare, 1996). However, not all psychopaths are in prison. Psychopaths can
also be found in such fields as the legal profession, the business world and in politics
(Babiak, 1995). In terms of criminal behaviors, psychopaths are arrested at earlier ages,
have a higher rate of offending, commit a wider array of offenses, are more likely to have
used weapons and threatened violence, and are more likely to have used violence (Hart
and Hare, 1997; Hare and McPherson, 1984; Serin, 1991; Wong, 1985). Also, once
released from an institution, rates of recidivism for psychopaths are found to be higher
than those for other criminals regarding both violent and non-violent criminal acts
(Hemphill, Hare & Wong, 1998). Therefore, the societal importance of the psychopathy
construct demanded that more research be conducted to better understand its underlying
etiology, potential variants in typology, clinical course and potential treatment.
Prior theories have proposed subtypes of psychopathy based on cognitive
variables (passive avoidance errors) and on physiological variables (BIS/BAS) and on
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environmental variables (supportive upbringing or not). This study utilized self-report
measures to assess the presence of psychopathy and to test the validity of the cognitive
and physiological explanations for subtypes of psychopathy. A cognitive dissonance task
tested the validity of the physiological theory and an alteration of a punishment task
which increases the degree and strength of punishment tested the cognitive theory.
Further, for the first time the construct of optimism was tested to determine it’s role in
parsing out two types of psychopathy.
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Introduction
For over half of a century, a small yet ever increasing group of social and
behavioral scientists have been investigating the construct of psychopathy. Even so, of
all the psychiatric determinants of criminal behavior, psychopathy is still likely the least
understood and agreed upon condition. Cleckley, in his 1941 book entitled The Mask of
Sanity, may have had the greatest early influence on the study of this construct. In the
original 1941 version, Cleckley detailed 19 criteria (e.g., lack of remorse, superficial
charm) that defined the "primary" psychopathic personality. He later condensed these 19
criteria to 16 by the time he wrote the 4th edition (Cleckley, 1976). These criteria have
subsequently directed much of the research on psychopathy and have served as the basis
for diagnostic measures of the construct, such as Hare's Psychopathy Checklist (PCL;
PCL-R)(Hare, 1991; Lykken, 1995).1
Undoubtedly, what interests many researchers about psychopaths is the negative
impact that such individuals often have on the rest of society, combined with a lack of
remorse that they often display about these effects. Such individuals have long invoked
both morbid curiosity and great concern at the same time. Regarding the negative impact
on others, the behaviors of psychopaths has led some to characterize them as intra-

1

Much of the psychopathy research focuses on studies using the PCL-R with offender samples.
By convention investigators have applied the term “psychopath” to individuals whose score on
the PCL-R exceeded some minimum level (commonly, but not consistently, 29). However,
psychopathy is not a recognized diagnosis in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual, and recent research on psychopathy indicates that it is a dimensional
rather than categorical construct (Edens, Marcus, Lilienfeld & Poythress, 2006; Marcus, John &
Edens, 2004). Thus, categorical language in this dissertation regarding “psychopaths” is
conventional and intended to connote individuals who attained, or are likely to attain, high scores
on whatever psychopathy measure is being discussed.
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species predators (Hare 1996). Even though it has been estimated that they make up only
about 1% of the general population, psychopaths are believed to make up 15-25% of the
prison population (Hare, 1996). However, not all psychopaths are violent criminals who
end up in prison. For example, the individuals that Cleckley based his observations on
were all non-prisoners coming from sources such as psychiatric hospitals and the
community (Cleckley, 1976). Psychopaths can be found in such fields as the legal
profession, the business world and in politics (Babiak, 1995). Such non-criminal
psychopaths often use times of upheaval to violate social norms, gain power over others
and cold-bloodedly use others for their own benefit.
In terms of criminal behaviors, psychopaths are arrested at earlier ages, have a
higher rate of offending, commit a wider array of offenses, are more likely to have used
weapons and threatened violence, and are more likely to have used violence (Hart and
Hare, 1997; Hare and McPherson, 1984; Serin, 1991). Continual problems with these
individuals even after they are caught is not surprising since the disorder is considered to
be stable and lifelong in its presentation (Harpur and Hare, 1994). Therefore, it should
not be surprising that psychopathy has been found to be predictive of recidivism after
release from prison and of behavioral problems for currently institutionalized individuals.
Regarding institutional misbehavior, researchers have found that institutionalized
psychopaths behave inappropriately (both violently and non-violently) at rates higher
than non-psychopathic institutionalized individuals (Hare, 1996). For example,
correlations between PCL-R scores and general institutional misbehavior have been
found to be quite high (r = .80) in those psychopaths who were serving sentences of at
least 7 months in length (Cooke, 1995). Two recent meta-analyses (Guy, Edens,
Anthony & Douglas (2005); Walters (2003)) indicate that of the two PCL-R factors of
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psychopathy (factor 1 capturing the interpersonal and affective aspects of the construct
and factor 2 capturing the antisocial and socially deviant lifestyle aspects of the
construct), it is factor 2 of the PCL-R that has been found to be most highly associated
with institutional misconduct. Also, Guy et al. (2005) found that it was the non-violent
modes of misconduct that showed the largest effect sizes regardless of whether the PCLR total score, factor 1 or 2 was examined. Further, regardless of which part of the PCL-R
was used, Guy et al. (2005) found that the smallest effect sizes were found for the
physically violent modes of misconduct. Lastly, psychopaths are often found to be
released later into their sentences and under closer supervision than non-psychopathic
offenders (Serin, Peters & Barbaree, 1990).
Once released from an institution, rates of recidivism for psychopaths are found to
be higher than those for other criminals regarding both violent and non-violent criminal
acts (Hemphill, Hare & Wong, 1998). Furthermore, released psychopaths have been
shown to violate the conditions of their release more frequently and pose more frequent
supervision problems while on release than do non-psychopaths (Hart, Kropp & Hare,
1988). In fact, as predicted by PCL-R scores, rates of violent recidivism by psychopaths
were found to be three to five times higher than that of non-psychopaths over a one-year
period directly after release from an institution (Hemphill, Hare & Wong, 1998). Most
important, the PCL-R has been found to predict recidivism better than other more widely
used predictor variables such as past criminal behavior, demographic variables or other
diagnoses related to criminal conduct such as Anti-Social Personality Disorder (ASPD)
(Hart, Kropp & Hare, 1988; Hemphill, Hare & Wong, 1998).
Despite the large and growing body of evidence of the utility of the construct of
psychopathy, it has yet to become officially recognized as a psychiatric disorder. For
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some time, psychopathy researchers have been lobbying to have psychopathy included in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) as a clinical diagnosis.
Their position has been that the diagnosis of ASPD (the official psychiatric diagnosis
with the strongest relations to criminality) is too broad and is, to a great extent, simply a
diagnosis based on the number of previous criminal behaviors. Therefore, ASPD as a
diagnosis would appear to be over inclusive and is being given to many people who may
at worst have only mild forms of a lesser psychiatric disorder, but who are being
diagnosed with ASPD because they are criminals who simply commit enough antisocial
or illegal acts to receive the diagnosis. In fact, the estimates of the percentage of
prisoners who fulfill the criteria for the ASPD diagnosis range from 50% to 80%
depending on sources (Hare, 1996; Hare, Forth & Strachan, 1992). On the other hand, as
mentioned previously, psychopathy has long been defined in terms of personality
characteristics that do not necessarily have anything to do with criminal behavior. As far
back as Cleckley, the most fundamental features of psychopathy are actually believed to
be affective and interpersonal characteristics rather than criminal behaviors per se
(Patrick, 2006). Furthermore, the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), the best
validated measure for assessing psychopathy in offenders, has been factor analyzed and
found to be underpinned by two correlated factors. Criminal behavior indicators
contribute to only one of these two factors, the other comprising mainly interpersonal and
affective features. Because a diagnosis of psychopathy is less behavior-based than is
ASPD, only about 15-25% of prisoners meet PCL-R criteria for a diagnosis of
psychopathy (Hare, 1996). However, as mentioned earlier, it is the psychopathic
offenders who commit more criminal acts in the community and are more problematic in
correctional and forensic institutions.
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Clearly, the societal importance of the psychopathy construct demands that more
research be conducted to better understand its underlying etiology, potential variants in
typology, clinical course and potential treatment. This dissertation study will investigate
aspects of psychopathy theory that detail potential underlying mechanisms for the
distinction between previously proposed subtypes of psychopathy. It is hoped that
through a clearer understanding of the etiology of the construct, it will be more likely that
psychopathy will be fully integrated into the DSM as a clinical diagnosis and that future
methods of treatment will also be possible.
Theories of the Construct of Psychopathy
Cleckley’s theory. Cleckley's apparent motivation in writing the original 1941
edition of The Mask of Sanity was simply to detail the characteristics of the syndrome
and in the 1976 edition he suggested that once the construct was better defined, it could
be "further differentiated" (p. 229). Since Cleckley's initial 1941 work, investigators in
the psychopathy field have come to call a psychopath characterized by his criteria as the
"primary psychopath".
Karpman’s theory. Cleckley's contemporary, Benjamin Karpman, also
contributed to early theoretical considerations about the existence of subtypes of
psychopathy. Karpman's work (1941; 1948) moved the field strongly towards examining
psychopathy as a construct with two distinct subtypes labeled "primary" and "secondary".
While acknowledging that on the surface, the behaviors of both types of psychopath
appeared similar, Karpman (1941; 1948) made intriguing distinctions between the
"primary" and "secondary" psychopaths in their etiology. He considered "primary"
psychopaths to have a constitutional (biological) deficit that rendered them unlikely to be
responsive to any treatment. He considered the behavior of "secondary" psychopaths to

5

be a product of their environment, without any underlying biological deficits, and that,
unlike the primary psychopath, "secondary" psychopaths may benefit from treatment
(Karpman, 1941; 1948).
Fowles’/Gray’s BIS/BAS theory. Fowles (1980) developed a coherent theoretical
framework pertaining to the "primary" type of psychopath as an individual who has a
biological etiology to his/her psychopathy. Fowles utilized Gray's (1975) two factor
learning theory that proposes the existence of three arousal systems within the autonomic
nervous system which, when activated, are believed to trigger specific types of
behavioral responses (Fowles, 1980). One of these systems is the behavioral activation
system (BAS). Activation of the BAS results in appetitive, approach oriented, rewardseeking behavior. The BAS becomes activated in response to conditioned stimuli for
rewards (Fowles, 1980). The second system of note here is the behavioral inhibition
system (BIS). Activation of the BIS results in inhibition of behavior, which has been
conditioned to signal either response contingent punishment or frustrative non-reward
(Fowles, 1980). In terms of research evidence for his position, Fowles (1980) presented
a number of experimental outcomes that support his position that a weak BIS is the basis
for psychopaths' behavior. This evidence includes studies which showed that
psychopath's had worse classical conditioning to aversive unconditioned stimuli than did
non-psychopaths, psychopaths showed smaller increases in skin conductance levels when
awaiting aversive stimuli, and psychopaths showed no reduction in HR in anticipation of
shock or aversive stimuli (Hare, 1978). In fact psychopaths' HR accelerated in
anticipation of aversive stimuli and that pointed to a potentially stronger BAS as well as a
weaker BIS in psychopaths. The results also showed that psychopaths were deficient in
electrodermal activities that were believed to be mediated by the BIS system alone.
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Based on his theorizing and this research data relating to the BIS and BAS systems,
Fowles (1980) proposed that a weak or deficient BIS system was at the root of the
clinical characteristics (low anxiety, low negative affect, inability to inhibit behavior
when faced with threats of punishment or non-reward) of the “primary” type of
psychopath.
Lykken’s theory. Lykken (1995) has also argued that differential BIS and BAS
functioning could help to distinguish the etiologies of secondary and primary
psychopaths. Originally Lykken (1957) proposed that primary psychopaths had a
deficient ability to experience fear, and that this led to an inability to learn from
punishment, which in turn, led to their antisocial behaviors. As Lykken described in his
1995 book, he conducted the first experiment to support the low-fear hypothesis in 1954.
He utilized subjects who fit all 16 of Cleckley's criteria for a psychopath (group 1), had
antisocial behavior but did not fit all 16 criteria (group 2) and 15 normal subjects
(matched for age, gender and education with the two psychopath groups) (group 3).
Lykken found that the group 1 individuals showed less fearfulness as measured by selfreported subjective ratings of the level of fearfulness of situations that they read about.
Lykken also found that those in group 1 showed lower electro-dermal responses to
conditioned punishing stimuli than other groups. Lastly, Lykken showed that
participants from group 1 showed more passive avoidance learning errors when they
more often made a mistake in choosing a punishing response while learning a task.
Lykken (1995) has stated that his low-fear hypothesis has not only been supported
experimentally by himself, but has also been repeatedly replicated by others as well.
Once Fowles proposed his theory, Lykken saw the inherent similarities in their
proposals and melded them together into what he called the Fowles-Gray-Lykken theory
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(Lykken ,1995). The Fowles-Gray-Lykken theory proposes that primary psychopathy is
a consequence of an inherently fearless temperament that is reflected in a weak BIS
system and which may lead to poor socialization. Lykken (1995) also stated that: "it
seems to me, in fact, that the Fowles-Gray-Lykken theory provides the firmest available
foundation on which to build the future experimental study of psychopathic personality.
It assimilates the Lykken low-fear theory, now the "weak BIS" theory; it suggests
a....secondary psychopath(y), the "strong BAS" individual...." (p. 163). As further
support, in a 2005 article, Newman et al., investigated the usefulness of the BIS/BAS
constructs in the distinction between types of psychopaths. In the 2005 article, Newman
and colleagues utilized Carver and White's (1994) BIS/BAS scales to determine if low
anxious psychopaths (primary) and high anxious psychopaths (secondary) differed on
self-reported trait manifestations of these hypothetical physiological constructs. The
results of this study suggested that primary psychopaths were indeed characterized by a
weak BIS and normal BAS as previously hypothesized by the Fowles-Gray-Lykken
theory (See figure 1 for a theoretical construction of how primary, secondary and nonpsychopaths should score on various indices according to the theories covered to this
point).
Status of the construct, taxon or dimensional? As appears to be the case
regarding many psychiatric diagnoses already included in the DSM, even with the
longstanding history of research on psychopathy, there has still been a good deal of
disagreement regarding whether psychopathy should be considered a taxon or
dimensional construct. A clear example of the taxonic viewpoint to psychopathy, is the
use of cut off scores (which are indicative of a categorical construct) in scoring the gold
standard measure of the construct (Hare's PCL, and later revision, the PCL-R).
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An early attempt to determine if psychopathy is dimensional or categorical was
conducted by Harris, Rice, and Quinsey (1994). These authors analyzed data acquired
through administering the PCL-R to a group of mentally ill offenders residing in a
psychiatric facility. They concluded from these analyses that psychopathy is a taxonic
construct. They also went as far as to propose what the appropriate cut off scores should
be for the use of the PCL-R in identifying psychopaths (Harris, Rice, and Quinsey, 1994).
The results of this study have strongly influenced many researcher's perceptions of the
construct.
However, those who felt that the construct was more likely dimensional in nature
have recently published findings based on new statistical techniques which rather
strongly refute the prior findings from Harris, Rice, and Quinsey (1994). First, Marcus,
John and Edens (2004) used three independent taxometric procedures to investigate the
structure of the construct and their results showed that psychopathy has a dimensional
structure when the construct is measured with the Psychopathic Personality Inventory
(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). Further, Edens, Markus, Lilienfeld and Poythress (2006)
followed up on Markus et al. (2004), by using four independent taxometric procedures to
investigate the same question while using the PCL-R as the measure of psychopathy.
Their results indicating that psychopathy is best considered a dimensional construct were
consistent with the earlier findings by Markus et al. (2004).
Measures of Psychopathy
Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist (PCL). In terms of the assessment of psychopathy,
Robert Hare (1980) developed the semi-structured interview called the Psychopathy
Checklist (PCL) and its later revision (PCL-R) (Hare, 1991, 2003). In conducting an
assessment of psychopathy, data from the semi-structured interview are combined with
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collateral information gathered from any available file reviews (such as department of
corrections records) are combined to make ratings of the degree to which any individual's
exhibited traits and behaviors match prototypes of 20 separate features. Hare (1996) has
written that "the total score for the PCL-R provides an estimate of the extent to which a
given individual matches the prototypical psychopath, as exemplified, in the 1976 work
of Cleckley" (p. 30). Factor analyses of the PCL and the PCL-R have shown that the
measures are composed of two factors. Factor 1 comprises items that incorporate the
affective and interpersonal features of psychopathy such as shallow affect, lack of
remorse and manipulative behavior, whereas factor 2 comprises items that incorporate
the features associated with impulsivity, social deviance and anti-social behaviors (Hare,
1996).
Although the PCL-R's two factors have been shown to be correlated at
approximately (r = .5), they also show differential correlations with many external
variables (Hare, 1996). For example, Factor 1 is significantly negatively correlated with
anxiety (Hare, 1991; Hare, 1996, Patrick, 1994), neuroticism (Brinkley et al., 2004; Hare,
1991), negative emotional responses (stress reactions) (Hicks et al., 2004; Hicks &
Patrick, 2006; Patrick, 1994), fear/distress responses (Buss and Plomin, 1984; Hicks &
Patrick, 2006), and negative affectivity (Patrick, 1994). Conversely, factor 2 shows a
significant positive correlation with anxiety (Hare, 1991; Hare, 1996, Patrick, 1994),
neuroticism (Brinkley et al., 2004; Hare, 1991), negative emotional responses (stress
reactions) (Hicks et al., 2004; Hicks & Patrick, 2006; Patrick, 1994), fear/distress
responses (Buss and Plomin, 1984; Hicks & Patrick, 2006) and negative affectivity
(Patrick, 1994). These two factors are also differentially correlated with planning (in
regards to aggressive behavior), such that factor 1 is positively correlated and factor 2 is
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negatively correlated with this construct (Hart and Dempster, 1997). Regarding variables
preferentially associated with only one of the two factors, factor 1 has been found to be
highly related to personality constructs such as narcissism and histrionic personality
disorder, whereas factor 2 has shown to be preferentially associated with a diagnosis of
ASPD, suicidality and substance abuse (Hare, 1996; Hare, Forth & Strahan, 1992;
Reardon, Lang & Patrick, 2002; Verona, Patrick & Joiner, 2001). These differential
relations between PCL-R factors and criterion variables appear to be most reliably
demonstrated when partial correlations are used (Benning et al., 2003). Specifically, for
those variables that tap into the negative emotionality construct, this may be due to
suppressor effects which can effect the strength of a relationship of two correlated
predictors (such as factor 1 and 2 from the PCL-R) when their relationship to a third
criterion variable is assessed (Hicks & Patrick, 2006).
Lilienfeld’s Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI). Recently a number of
self-report measures of psychopathy have also been developed. One of these is
Lilienfeld's Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). As
mentioned, this measure employs a self-report format in contrast to the lengthy semistructured interview with file review required for the PCL-R. The PPI also has shown a
clear two-factor structure (Benning et al., 2003), although the PPI factors are
uncorrelated with each other. These two PPI factors have shown substantial similarity in
their external correlations to those of the two factors of the more resource intensive PCLR. As with PCL-R factor 1, PPI Factor I is negatively correlated with trait anxiety, stress
reactions, negative emotionality, while having negligible relation to with drug and abuse
as well as anti-social behavior (Benning et al., 2003; Patrick et al., 2006). Similar to
PCL-R factor 2, PPI factor II is positively related to drug and alcohol abuse, poor
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planning, aggressiveness, anti-social behavior, negative emotionality and anxiety
(Benning et al., 2003; Patrick et al., 2006). One study which was conducted before the
two factor structure of the PPI was discovered showed that convergent validity between
the PPI total score and PCL-R was .54 for factor 1, .40 for factor 2 and .54 with the PCLR total score (Poythress et al., 1998). However, it was also found in the Poythress et al.
study that most of the unique variance of the PPI scores was associated with the PCL-R
factor 1 scale. This would seem to indicate that the PPI may tap more into the core
affective-interpersonal factors of psychopathy which is what PCL-R factor 1 is believed
to measure.
Levenson’s Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRPS). Levenson and colleagues also
created a self-report measure of psychopathy that is called the Self-Report Psychopathy
Scale (SRPS; Levenson, Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995). Like Lilienfeld's measure, the SRPS
was designed to be used with non-offender populations. Some of the main benefits of
this scale are its brevity (it consists of only 26 questions) and the fact that when factor
analyzed, it can be parsed into 2 scales that are purported to be similar to factor’s 1 and 2
from Hare's PCL-R measure. The primary scale of the SRPS consists of 16 questions
that are analogous to Hare's factor 1 of the PCL-R. The secondary scale of the SRPS
consists of 10 items and is analogous to Hare's factor 2 of the PCL-R. Lynam, Whiteside
and Jones (1999) conducted a validation study of the SRPS and concluded that there was
good evidence for the validity of this measure in a college student sample. They also
determined that over an 8-week period, the test-retest reliability of the SRPS was quite
high (r = .83). Brinkley et al. (2001), also validated this measure (this time against the
PCL-R) in a prison sample and reported that the SRPS showed good internal consistency
and was significantly correlated with the total score and factor scores of the PCL-R.
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However, the magnitude of the correlations were small to modest, suggesting that the
SRPS measures a somewhat different construct than the PCL-R. Although originally
developed for use with non-offender populations, this scale is currently being studied in
groups institutionalized in a correctional setting to determine its validity and reliability
with such populations.
Research on Subtyping Psychopathy
Newman’s response modulation deficit. Even with the evident abundance of
work on the construct, presently there is still no single theory to explain the different
etiologies of subtypes of psychopaths that receives unequivocal support. In the last
decade however, it has been the physiological theories that have appeared to have
received the lion's share of the attention from researchers. Perhaps it was only a matter
of time before researchers more closely focused on physiology for answers as to what
makes psychopaths tick. One specific line of psychopathy research that, in part, falls
under the physiological umbrella (depending on what level of analysis one prefers to
focus on) has been conducted by Joseph Newman and his colleagues. Since the 1980's,
Newman and colleagues have been examining the difficulty that psychopaths were
theorized to exhibit in passively avoiding punishment or non-reward to learned
conditioned stimuli (Arnet, Howland, Smith, & Newman, 1993; Newman & Kosson,
1986; Newman, Widom & Nathan, 1985; Patterson, Kosson & Newman, 1987; Newman
et al., 1990). In their experiments, Newman and colleagues have compared the
performance of both high anxious psychopaths (secondary psychopaths) and low anxious
psychopaths (primary psychopaths) with that of non-psychopaths on tasks that could be
used to assess the ability to engage in passive avoidance.
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While not originally stated as such by Newman and colleagues, their line of
inquiry appears to fit well with the work of Fowles (1980), who theorized that those low
in BIS are likely to exhibit difficulty passively avoiding a stimulus after being operantly
conditioned to respond. Further, Fowles (1988) cited studies by Newman and colleagues
(Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman, Widom & Nathan, 1985) as evidence for the role
of the BIS system in poor passive avoidance learning. Utilizing a learning theory
approach Newman and colleagues have shown in a number of studies that psychopaths
with low levels of anxiety (similar to what many would consider a primary psychopath)
do have a more difficult time than do non-psychopaths in discontinuing their responding
to a stimulus once it is no longer advantageous for them to continue responding (Arnet,
Howland, Smith, & Newman, 1993; Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987; Newman,
Widom & Nathan, 1985; Newman et al., 1990).
Based on his previous work, Newman has proposed a cognitive theory to explain
why the low anxious psychopaths are poor at passively avoiding the punishments in his
paradigm. In this theory (called the response modulation hypothesis), psychopaths
become too narrowly focused on the behavior which has been conditioned as rewarding
and do not notice the change in payoffs as they proceed through the experimental
protocol, during which time, the originally rewarded behavior becomes punished instead
(Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987). More recently, Newman (1997) conducted
research directed at determining the relation between behavioral inhibition and the
differing types of psychopathy. While in this article he did not find a relation between
psychopathy and his measure of BIS, he did acknowledge the likelihood that a
psychobiological process may be at the heart of the passive avoidance learning deficit
that he and his group have been investigating for over a decade. However, there have
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also been studies that have not been supportive of the deficiencies that psychopaths are
thought to exhibit in passive avoidance tasks. First, Schmauk (1970) did not find that
low anxious (primary) psychopaths differed from controls on measures of skin
conductance when they took part in a passive avoidance task involving the potential loss
of money as part of the task. Second, Howard, Payamal & Neo (1997), attempted to
replicate earlier work by Newman and his colleagues and did not find that psychopaths
differed from non-psychopaths on passive avoidance tasks.
Even though some of the above studies only infer physiological processes while
others directly measure it, it still stands that they suggest that the physiological
underpinnings of psychopathy are not yet fully understood. Yet this is understandable
when considering the many different social behaviors and physiological responses that
have been studied both within and across laboratories. Also, following from Cacioppo
and Bernston's (1992) doctrine of multilevel analysis, it should be clear that while macro
level (social) behaviors are most completely understood only when their micro level
(biological) antecedents are examined, for any macro level behavior there could be
multiple micro level antecedents and conversely any micro level antecedent may produce
many differing macro level behaviors depending on macro level conditions. A classic
example given by Cacioppo and Bernston (1992) describes a researcher observing the
behavior of a group of chimpanzees. The researcher is confused about why they were not
mating as anticipated. After taking blood samples, it is found that there is nothing wrong
with them hormonally yet they do not mate. Only later is it discovered that the makeup
of their social order in their cages was incorrect. Once this social (macro level) problem
was understood and corrected, the chimpanzees soon began to mate as was expected. If
researchers had only relied on the hormonal (micro level) information, they never would
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have understood what was wrong and why the chimpanzees were not mating. But
through an investigation at multiple levels of analysis, researchers were able to more
fully understand the situation.
This complexity involved in best understanding any construct and its operating
mechanisms (or etiology) could easily explain why the results from some studies are not
universally supportive of the physiological position (Howard, Payamal & Neo, 1997;
Newman, 1997; Schmauk, 1970). However, this lack of consistent support for the
physiological (BIS/BAS arousal) position simply supports the case for more research to
be conducted on the various macro level conditions that may elicit different behaviors
from the two subtypes of psychopaths (different both from each other as well as from
non-psychopaths as well).
Newman’s procedure for assessing passive avoidance deficits. At this point it is
appropriate to describe in some detail the task that Newman and colleagues have used to
assess passive avoidance learning. While some minor aspects of the task can vary, the
basic conditions are that participants are presented with stimuli and when they respond
incorrectly (i.e., they make a response, rather than withholding a response) they commit a
passive avoidance error. The basic design of the task consists of numbers being
presented sequentially on a computer screen and participants must learn on their own to
distinguish the stimuli (which numbers on a screen) that are rewarded (e.g., earning a
dime) for responding (pressing a button) from those that are punished (e.g., losing a
dime) for responding (pressing a button). Conceptually it is expected that, after being
presented with an initial practice block of stimuli that contains a high proportion of
rewarding stimuli, participants should become conditioned to actively respond to stimuli
which are presented on the screen. Once active responding has been established as a
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dominant response set, then the reward schedule changes. Over the course of numerous
blocks of trials, rewarding and punishing stimuli are presented equally as often within
each block. In fact, if a participant responded to every stimulus that is presented they
would be rewarded half of the time and punished half of the time. The only difference
within each block is the order in which rewarding and punishing stimuli are presented.
Further, when participants respond to the various task stimuli, they are either monetarily
rewarded (for correct responses) or punished (for incorrect responses, otherwise known
as passive avoidance errors). It is at this point that participants must exhibit their ability
to passively (on their own through experience) learn to avoid making errors. If the
participant can withhold responding to non-rewarding stimuli at this point, then he/she
has learned to passively avoid committing errors. If the participant does not withhold
responses to non-rewarding stimuli, then that person has not learned to passively avoid
committing errors.
While Newman and colleagues have accumulated evidence for the presence of
this passive avoidance deficit, they have still utilized a rather narrow range of macro
level stimuli (this being a stimulus at a more observable, social level) to produce the
effect. In essence, they have only determined that their primary type of psychopath
shows passive avoidance decrements when rewards and punishments are given out
equally in an experiment. This leaves open the question of whether passive avoidance is
a broad macro level problem or not. What is lacking and has not been attempted as of yet
is to dramatically change the reward/punishment pattern for psychopaths within an
experiment to see if an abrupt change in the payoffs will lead to improved passive
avoidance learning.
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As a point of departure, let us again examine the rate of reward and punishment in
previous experiments. As mentioned above, the rate of payoffs in Newman's passive
avoidance task has been intermittent in nature, with half of the stimuli in each block
being rewarding and half punishing, but the order of these outcomes is variable. What
has not been examined is the response of psychopathic individuals to an experimental
situation in which they are faced with a sudden, large increase in the frequency of nonrewarded stimuli. Also, none of the Newman experiments increased the severity of the
punishment during the protocol. The results from decades of research on the effects of
rewards and punishments on animals and humans has clearly shown that increasing either
the intensity or frequency of a punishment will decrease a target behavior and that
increasing both is the strongest method of all to decrease an unwanted target behavior
(Appel, 1968; Bradshaw, Szabadi & Bevan, 1979; Critchfield, et al., 2003; Johnston,
1972; Lande, 1981; Moffitt, 1983; Sizemore & Maxwell, 1985). Therefore, as a first
purpose for this dissertation, I propose to extend the work by Newman and colleagues by
utilizing a protocol that while similar to their previous designs, will differ substantially in
the intensity and frequency of punishments experienced by participants and thereby
extend the field's knowledge about the macro level conditions under which the different
subtypes of psychopaths (as compared to each other and to non-psychopaths) exhibit
passive avoidance deficits.
Physiological responses to emotionally provoking stimuli. A second and more
physiologically based course of investigation in the psychopathy literature involves the
deficit or even complete absence of normal responses that psychopaths are believed to
exhibit in response to various emotion-provoking stimuli (Cleckley, 1976; Day and
Wong, 1996; Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 1993; Patrick, 2001; Williamson, Hare, & Wong,
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1987). Whereas some investigators suggest that this condition accounts for poor passive
avoidance learning (due to a lack of the production of a fear or anxiety response which
should inhibit responding), this condition could potentially lead to other behaviors in the
psychopath as well. First, what is the supporting research evidence that psychopaths in
general, and any subtype specifically may lack normal emotional responses to stimuli?
While the support for this position is not unanimous, a number of researchers have
provided evidence that in a number of contexts, psychopaths show a decrement in their
responses to words, pictures or vignettes that elicit emotional reactions from normal
individuals (Christiansen et al., 1996; Kiehl, Hare, McDonald & Brink, 1999; Patrick,
1994; Steuerwald & Kosson, 2000; Williamson, Harpur & Hare, 1991). Furthermore, it
has been shown in a number of studies that decrements in emotional responding are
associated preferentially with features associated with primary psychopathy (e.g., PCL-R
Factor 1) (Lorenz and Newman, 2002; Patrick, Bradley & Lang, 1993; Patrick, 1994).
Proposed New Directions in Subtyping Psychopathy
Cognitive dissonance. An experimental model that could capitalize on the
deficits in affective responding described above would provide a valuable vehicle for
investigating the differentiation of psychopathic subtypes. Just such a paradigm is
outlined in the theory of cognitive dissonance. Festinger originally proposed the theory
of cognitive dissonance in 1957 and since that time the theory has been extensively
researched. In cognitive dissonance theory Festinger (1957) outlined what would happen
when 2 or more cognitions that people held, or also when cognitions people held and
behaviors they engaged in, were dissonant. Festinger (1957) proposed that when people
recognized that their cognitions alone or cognitions and behaviors together were in a state
of dissonance, they would experience an uncomfortable state of psychological tension
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and would be driven to reduce that tension (usually through means of attitude change
regarding one of the cognitions involved in the dissonant state). It has long been believed
that this state of tension is directly caused by physiological arousal. Even though the
theory as Festinger originally proposed it has undergone revisions, the notion that
physiological arousal is at the core of the dissonance state has remained integral to the
theory.
Support for this aspect of the theory has come from a number of sources. Early
on, researchers used misattribution approaches to infer that arousal was present when
dissonance was induced (Zanna and Cooper, 1974). The misattribution approach
required researchers to convince participants that they would be feeling either aroused or
relaxed due to some clear external source. Once participants were convinced that the
external source was causing them to feel as they did (either aroused or relaxed), the
researchers then engaged participants in a dissonance induction manipulation. The
researchers hypothesized that those individuals who were led to attribute their arousal to
an external source would not show attitude change in response to the dissonance
induction. Conversely, it was hypothesized that participants led to believe that they
would be relaxed by the external source would show attitude change due to the
dissonance induction. Researchers believed this would be the case, because those
participants who already believed that something else was making them feel aroused
would not feel the need to change their attitudes (in order to reduce the arousal created by
the dissonance induction) because they could easily attribute their arousal to the external
source. However, those who had nothing to misattribute their aroused state to would
correctly perceive that the aroused feeling they were experiencing was due to the
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dissonant action they had just engaged in, and they would change their attitudes to deal
with their feelings of arousal. This in fact is exactly what researchers found.
Since the early days of cognitive dissonance research, many new experimental
paradigms for inducing dissonance have been designed to create dissonance. One of the
most well known and most frequently used involves a writing task. In this paradigm,
participants write counter-attitudinal statements under conditions of either high or low
choice about the topic they write on. The idea behind this paradigm was that when
people write something they do not believe in, that it would create a dissonant condition
between the expressed statement made in the writing task and their personal beliefs.
Further, if individuals were able to tell themselves that they had no choice but to write
what they were told to write, then they would have an excuse for why they committed the
act that was dissonant and they would not feel the arousal due to the dissonant act.
However, if they freely chose to write the counter-attitudinal statements, then they would
feel arousal due to the knowledge that they had freely acted in a dissonant fashion
because they would not be able to blame their actions on anyone but themselves. The
creation of arousal and the following change in target attitudes after the dissonance
induction writing task is exactly what researchers found when they have tested the
counter attitudinal essay paradigm (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990).
Continuing work on the writing paradigm has also revealed various conditions
under which the writing task can be carried out and still create dissonance in the
participants. For instance, it has been found that it is possible to create dissonance in
participants who write the counter attitudinal statements in an anonymous fashion by
either not writing their name on the paper they write on, by throwing away the paper
afterwards or both (Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon & Nelson, 1996). Also, it
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has been found that dissonance can be created even when participants are "forced" to
write on a specific topic (Gaes, Melburg & Tedeschi, 1986; Harmon-Jones, Brehm,
Greenberg, Simon & Nelson, 1996; Stone, 2003). On the surface, this would seem to go
against the necessity of having the high choice/low choice conditions mentioned earlier.
However, what has been found is that if participants are merely politely persuaded or
asked to write on a specific topic, and if they are also told a number of times that they
don't have to write about that topic if they don't really want to, they will often perceive
that they are writing about the topic of their own free will, even though in the end they
are really writing on the exact topic that the experimenter wanted them to. Lastly, it has
also been found that if participants are provided with the statements to make and merely
follow what they are told to say, that they will feel dissonance just as strongly as do
people who come up with their own personal arguments (Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Gaes,
Melburg & Tedeschi, 1986).
Croyle and Cooper (1983) provided the first direct physiological evidence that
dissonance does indeed produce an arousal response. These authors used nonspecific
skin conductance responses (SCRs) to measure participant's autonomic arousal to provide
evidence that cognitive dissonance does indeed create physiological arousal. These
authors placed one group of participants in a situation where they freely made their own
choice to write a counter-attitudinal essay. As compared to a second group which was
given no choice but to write a counter-attitudinal essay, and a third group that wrote a
pro-attitudinal essay, the authors found that only the first group showed physiological
arousal (as measured by SCRs) due to the task of writing an essay. Croyle and Cooper
(1983) concluded that freely acting in a counter-attitudinal manner does indeed induce
arousal in people. Subsequent experiments also used physiological means to confirm the
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previous findings that arousal was present when dissonance was induced (Etgen and
Rosen, 1993; Elkin and Leippe, 1986).
Most important, Losch and Cacioppo (1990) showed that it was not simply
general physiological arousal that led to dissonance reduction efforts, but instead it was a
state of negatively affectively laden arousal that was at work. If it is true that primary
psychopaths are less affected by emotionally negative stimuli, experience low levels of
negative affect (if they experience any at all), and are deficient in their learned responses
to punishment (as exhibited in poor passive avoidance learning and low BIS arousal),
then compared to secondary psychopaths and non-psychopaths, they should show clear
differences in their responses to a cognitive dissonance induction. Furthermore, Cooper
and Fazio (1984) proposed that based on the evidence about dissonance theory,
dissonance arousal could be thought of as a conditioned emotional response. Given the
previous research suggesting that primary psychopaths are deficient in their BIS
activation to conditioned punishments, it should follow that they would not show the
arousal response that would lead to feelings of dissonance. Therefore, as the second
purpose for this dissertation, I propose to utilize a cognitive dissonance induction
paradigm to test the hypothesis that after the induction paradigm has been completed,
primary psychopaths will not attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance (because they do
not feel the uncomfortable arousal which would drive them to do so), whereas secondary
psychopaths and non-psychopaths will behave as normal individuals would and attempt
to reduce feelings of arousal due to dissonance. If this is the case, this will further extend
the field's knowledge about the psychopathy construct. It may also help explain why
primary psychopaths feel no remorse for their actions and find it so easy to lie and
manipulate individuals. Without the physiological feelings that give rise to cognitive
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dissonance, they would not be bothered when their actions or words are dissonant with
their later behaviors.
Optimism. Lastly, a previously unstudied construct in the field of psychopathy
research will be investigated in this study. This construct is that of positive expectancy
(which has most frequently been studied under the rubric of optimism and has been
conceptualized as a general expectation that good outcomes will come from one's efforts
(Scheier & Carver, 1985; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994)). This construct is of interest
here in part because of it's strong prior relations with variables that have been
consistently shown to help differentiate between primary and secondary psychopaths.
The construct of optimism has been discussed since Descartes (Domino & Conway,
2001), yet it was the work of Carver and Scheier in the 1980's that really moved the
construct into the respectable mainstream of psychological research. Even though the
construct was not new, Scheier and Carver made great strides regarding the construct
when they developed the first important measures of trait optimism called the Life
Orientation Test (LOT) (Scheier & Carver, 1985) and its later revision (LOT-R) (Scheier,
Carver & Bridges, 1994), by far the most widely used research measures of optimism or
of any conceptualization of positive expectancy.
To date, most of the research on optimism has focused on topics such as health
outcomes (Carver et al., 1993; Irving et al., 1998; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Scheier et al.,
1986; Snyder, 1996, 1998; Snyder, Feldman et al., 2000), risky behaviors (among them
alcohol and drug abuse) (Brown et al., 2002; Carvajal, Clair, Nash & Evans, 1998;
Carvajal, Evans, Nash & Getz, 2002; Grunbaum et al., 2000; Kashani et al., 1997;
Magura et al., 2003; McCauley Ohannessian et al., 1993; Scheier, Carver & Bridges,
1994; Willinger et al., 2002), personal achievement (Currey, Snyder et al., 1997; Snyder,
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Michael & Cheavens, 1999; Snyder, Hoza et al., 1997) and coping (Aspinwall & Taylor,
1992; Carver et al., 1993; Cozzarelli, 1993; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994; Scheier,
Weintraub & Carver, 1986; Shifren & Hooker, 1995; Strutton & Lumpkin, 1992).
It is interesting that even with all of the research on optimism noted above, after
20 years there are no published studies in which attempts have been made to relate
optimism (as measured with the LOT or LOT-R) to propensity for criminal behavior per
se (the only illegal behaviors previously related to LOT measured optimism has been
illegal substance use (Carvajal, Clair, Nash & Evans, 1998; Carvajal, Evans, Nash &
Getz, 2002; McCauley Ohannessian et al., 1993; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994;
Strack, Carver & Blaney, 1987)). This lack of research on criminality and optimism is
likely due to the fact that people do not seem to associate an optimistic attitude with
criminal behavior. Instead, people tend to think of optimism in regards to positive and/or
socially acceptable behaviors such as those listed earlier.
Since optimism has not been studied in association with crime per se, it should
come as no surprise that optimism has not been studied relative to its potential relations
with psychopathy. Yet previous research would seem to indicate that this construct is
likely to be useful in differentiating between the two types of psychopaths. For example,
positive expectancies (not always as measured by the LOT or LOT-R) have been found
to have associations with a number of external correlates that parallel those, summarized
above, found with primary psychopathy. For example, positive expectancies are
inversely related to anxiety (Campbell & Kwon, 2001; Kwon, 2002; Lewis & Kliewer,
1995; Raikkonen et al., 1999; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994), negative affect (Chang
& Sanna, 2001; Kashani et al., 1997; Lucas, Diener & Suh, 1996; Raikkonen et al.,
1999), neuroticism (Mascaro, Rosen & Morey, 2004; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994),
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suicide (Beck, Steer, Kovacks & Garrison, 1985; Kaslow et al., 2002; Meadows &
Kaslow, 2002) and substance abuse (Bolland, 2003; Brown et al., 2002; Carvajal, Clair,
Nash & Evans, 1998; Carvajal, Evans, Nash & Getz, 2002; Grunbaum et al., 2000;
McCauley Ohannessian et al., 1993; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994; Willinger et al.,
2002). Positive expectancies have also been found to be positively related to positive
affect (Chang & Sanna, 2001; Kashani et al., 1997; Lucas, Diener & Suh, 1996;
Raikkonen et al., 1999), narcissism (Harpur et al., 1989; Hickman, Watson & Morris,
1996; McHoskey, Worzel & Szyarto, 1998; Reiss, Grubin & Meux, 1999),
success/achievement (Curry, Snyder et al., 1997; Snyder, Michael & Cheavens, 1999;
Snyder, Hoza et al., 1997), planning (Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994; Snyder et al.,
1991), persistence (Polivy & Herman, 2002), and conscientiousness (Mascaro, Rosen &
Morey, 2004). (see appendix A for citations and for a matrix of optimism/primary
psychopathy relations).
Conversely, indicators of secondary psychopathy and measures of positive
expectancies show opposing correlations with external criteria as, anxiety, neuroticism,
suicide, negative affect, and substance abuse. For all of these variables, responses by
secondary psychopaths show positive correlations and responses from those high on
positive expectancies show negative relations to these variables (see appendix B for
citations and for matrix of optimism/secondary psychopathy relations). On the other
hand, indicators of secondary psychopathy are negatively correlated with measures of
planning and conscientiousness, whereas the measures of positive expectancies have
been found to be positively correlated with these same measures (see appendix B for
citations and for matrix of optimism/secondary psychopathy relations).
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Based on the patterns of findings described above, it is hypothesized that (similar
to anxiety) measures of trait optimism may differentiate between primary and secondary
psychopaths. Further, recent research suggests that optimism may also serve as a
mediator between psychopathy and performance on some cognitively based tasks.
Segerstrom (2001) showed that optimists show an unconscious attentional bias for
positive stimuli. Using a stroop task as a measure of unconscious automatic processing,
Segerstrom showed that attentional bias for positive words increased as optimism
increased, while attentional bias for negative stimuli decreased as optimism increased.
This means that the more optimistic a person is, the more they unconsciously attend to
positive stimuli in their environment at the expense of attending to the negative stimuli in
their environment. She also found that pessimism was related to faster skin conductance
response rates than optimism when negative stimuli were presented. This suggests that
either optimists were not taking in all of the negative information they were presented, or
that perhaps they were not as threatened by the negative information as were pessimists.
Reviewing Newman's studies in light of the findings of Segerstrom's study, it would seem
plausible that Newman's low anxious psychopaths may react the way they do to the
passive avoidance tasks (commit more errors of commission) because of high levels of
optimism which make them focus much more on positive stimuli (winning money at the
task for making responses) and not feel as threatened by negative information such as
losing money for making an error of commission.
Further, Gibson and Sanbonmatsu (2004) found that optimists and pessimists
differed in their expectations of winning when gambling and in the degree to which they
would persevere in gambling even while losing. To begin with, the authors found that
optimists reported having stronger beliefs than pessimists that they could win at
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gambling. Also, optimists were found to maintain this belief in their ability to win even
in the face of losses. In contrast, pessimists lowered their expectations about future wins
when they recently lost money. According to Cohen’s (1988) terminology, there was
also a medium and statistically significant correlation (.37) between scores on the LOT-R
and the belief that one could win in the long run. This correlation indicated that optimists
felt positive about their long term prospects of winning if they just persisted in their
gambling behavior. Also, these authors found that pessimists preferred to bet less after
losses while optimists seemed insensitive to failure and did not change their betting
habits after losses.
Further, according to the authors, optimists tended to overestimate past
performance while pessimists tended to underestimate past performance. Perhaps this
was most clearly shown when all participants were put into identical controlled situations
in which wins and losses were equal for everyone. In this situation, optimists tended to
recall more "near wins" in the lose condition than did pessimists, while there was no
difference in "near win" perceptions for the win condition. Therefore, the results of the
Gibson and Sanbonmatsu (2004) study paints a picture of the optimistic gambler as
someone who has higher expectations for winning, will bet more for longer and perceives
many "near wins" in their losses.
A number of studies paint a similar picture of psychopaths as overly confident in
their ability to win. In the first of such studies, Seigel (1978), had psychopaths and nonpsychopaths play card games in which they could win or lose money depending on the
type of card they turned over next from a preordered deck of cards. Seigel (1978) found
that psychopaths committed more errors of commission and also reported significantly
higher beliefs than non-psychopaths that the next card they turned over would be a
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winner. Newman, Patterson and Kosson (1987) also used a card turning task in
continuing to investigate deficits in passive avoidance in psychopaths. They found that
psychopaths showed perseveration in their behaviors as exhibited by continuing to play
significantly further through a deck of cards (which had a steadily increasing rate of
punishment per every 10 cards played) than did non-psychopaths. When again this is
considered in relation to optimism and its relations to the continued errors of commission
committed by psychopaths in passive avoidance tasks, it seems plausible that optimism
may be mediating the relationship between psychopathy and performance on passive
avoidance tasks.
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The Present Study
Hypotheses
For the purpose of testing hypotheses 1-3, groups were created through means of
cluster analyses techniques (details of the methods for this clustering are described in the
results section). Following from previous methodology in psychopathy research, clusters
were created through the use of multiple measures that theoretically should separate
primary and secondary psychopaths from each other (as well as from non-psychopathic
individuals) in their responses. Measures previously used for this purpose that I utilized
for this study were: Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRSP), BIS/BAS scales,
and the Harm Avoidance scale from the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire
(MPQ-HA). Through use of these measures and the clustering techniques, I attempted to
form groups whose cluster profiles best reflected the theoretical profiles of either primary
psychopathy, secondary psychopathy or neither (which will be considered to be a nonpsychopath comparison group). These groups were then used to test the following
hypotheses:
1(a).

When engaging in a passive avoidance task (as designed and used in
previous studies by Newman and colleagues), members of the primary
psychopath cluster will commit significantly more passive avoidance
errors than will either members of the secondary psychopath cluster or
those in the non-psychopathic cluster. These results will serve as a
replication of much of the previous work on this topic, as well as setting
up the necessary condition to test hypothesis 1(b).
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1(b).

Punishment frequency and intensity will act to moderate the number of
passive avoidance errors for members of the primary psychopath cluster.
Specifically, at higher levels of intensity and frequency of punishment,
members of the primary psychopathy group will show significantly
reduced levels of passive avoidance errors as compared to their own level
of passive avoidance errors when frequency and intensity of punishment is
lower.

2.

Those in the primary psychopath cluster will exhibit significantly less
attitude change following a cognitive dissonance induction task, than will
those in either the secondary psychopath cluster or the non-psychopathic
cluster.

3.

Members of the primary psychopath cluster will score significantly higher
on the LOT-R than will those in the secondary psychopath cluster.

4.

Optimism, as measured on the LOT-R, will mediate the relationship
between primary psychopathy and the number of errors of commission
made on a card playing passive avoidance task.
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Method
Participants
Participants consisted of a convenience sample drawn from the population of a
court ordered drug treatment program in southwestern Florida. Participants were
volunteers who were notified that they had the right to withdraw from the study at any
time without fear of punishment. Participants from this type of facility were used for this
study due to the fact that in such a criminally convicted population, there was likely to be
a higher proportion of individuals high on psychopathic traits than would be found in
university classroom populations or other community samples. To be eligible for
participation, individuals had to have been: (a) be male; (b) be between the ages of 20
and 50 inclusive; (c) be White, Black or Latino; (d) be English speaking; (e) be able to
read and comprehend at at least a 9th grade level; (f) not be experiencing active
symptoms of psychosis; (g) not have an IQ below 70.
Measures
Demographics questionnaire. This questionnaire asked basic demographic
questions about age, education level, family makeup, and criminal history. This
questionnaire is being newly created for this study.
Intelligence. Quick Test (QT; Ammons & Ammons, 1962). The QT is a brief
intelligence test based on perceptual-verbal performance. Participants are asked to look
at an 8.5 X 11 inch card with 4 different pictures on it. Sequentially, a series of words is
presented and the participant’s task is to point to the picture that illustrates the object or
idea represented in each word. The words steadily increase in difficulty level and the test
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ends when the participant fails on 6 consecutive responses. Reliability of the QT with an
adult sample has been high at .86 and correlations with other IQ tests are also acceptable
(.77 with Stanford-Binet and .96 with Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale).
Reading level. Basic Reading Inventory (BRI; Johns, J. L., 1981). The BRI is a
reading and comprehension inventory. If participants indicated that they had less than a
9th grade education, the BRI was given to determine if they could read and comprehend
at at least a 9th grade level. The BRI consists of reading a 1 page multi-paragraph
passage and answering a standardized set of questions about the passage afterwards.
Psychopathy. Levinson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRPS; Levenson, Kiehl
& Fitzpatrick, 1995). The SRPS Is a 26-item self-report questionnaire designed to
measure psychopathy. Although designed for use with non-institutionalized samples, it
has also been used with institutionalized groups as well (Brinkley et al., 2001). Factor
analyses have shown that 16 items load onto a factor which Levenson contends are
conceptually similar to primary psychopathy and the remaining 10 items load onto a
factor that Levenson believes to be conceptually similar to the characteristics of
secondary psychopathy. The 26 items are completed by using a 4-point scale, which
ranges from "Disagree strongly" on one end, to "Agree strongly" on the other. Internal
reliability for the primary psychopathy items has been found to be .82 and for the
secondary psychopathy items internal reliability has been found to be .63 (Levenson,
Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995). Test-retest reliability over an 8 week period has been found
to be .83 (Lynam, Whiteside & Jones, 1999). The SRPS was used as the psychopathy
measure of choice for this study due to previous relations that have been found between
Newman's Go-No-Go task and psychopathy (as assessed by the SRPS (Brinkley et al.,
(2001); Lynam, Whiteside & Jones (1999)). These previous relations were important in
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showing that the passive avoidance effects have been replicated before I assessed how
increases in the severity and frequency of punishment may moderate those same effects.
Anxiety. Welsh Anxiety Scale (WAS; Welsh, 1956). The WAS is a 39-item truefalse scale derived from the MMPI that measures anxiety and relates to negative affect
more generally. The items from the WAS tap four aspects of anxiety: trouble
concentrating, negative affect, low energy/pessimism, personal sensitivity. Previous
study of the WAS has determined that it has excellent internal consistency of between
.92-.94 (Graham, 1987; Hale et al., 2004)
Behavioral inhibition/behavioral activation. Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral
Activation Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver and White, 1994). These scales were created to
assess individuals' responses to potentially rewarding or punishing events. This measure
consists of 20 items which are completed by using a 4-point scale, which ranges from
"Agree strongly" on one end, to "Disagree strongly" on the other. Of the 20 items, the
BIS scale consists of 7 items and the BAS scale consists of 13 items. Further, within the
BAS scale there are 3 correlated subscales: Reward Responsiveness (5); Drive (4 items);
Fun Seeking (4 items). Previous use of the BIS/BAS scales have shown that these
measures have acceptable internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .76 (BIS) and .83
(BAS)) and test-retest reliability for the BAS ranging from .59 (Reward Responsiveness)
to .69 (Fun Seeking) (Jorm et al., 1999).
Attitudes. Cognitive Dissonance Attitude Measure. This measure contained 10
questions asking participants to rate their attitudes on a number of topics relating to
current personal issues. The items were completed using a 10-point scale that ranged
from "Strongly Agree" on one end, to "Strongly Disagree" on the other. On this measure,
9 of the 10 items are distracter items intended to keep the participant from focusing on
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the 1 item that they will be writing about during the cognitive dissonance induction task
(described below). Participants completed this measure twice (once before the cognitive
induction task and once again immediately after the task). This measure was newly
created for this study.
Manipulation check. Freedom of choice manipulation check. Participants were
asked to rate how free they felt to choose to write the statement that they wrote in the
cognitive dissonance induction task. The question was administered at the end of the
experiment and consisted of an 11-point scale which ranges from "Not at all free to
choose" on one end to "Completely free to choose" on the other.
Optimism. Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver & Bridges,
1994). The LOT-R was developed to tap generalized positive expectancies. This scale
consists of 10 items (4 of which are filler items) that are completed by using a 5-point
scale, which ranges from "Strongly disagree" on one end, to "Strongly agree" on the
other. Higher scores on the LOT-R indicate greater dispositional optimism. Previous use
of the LOT-R has shown this measure to have acceptable internal reliability (Cronbach's
alpha = .78) and test-retest reliability (r = .79) over 28 months (Scheier, Carver &
Bridges, 1994).
Fearlessness. Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire--Harm Avoidance
scale (MPQ-HA; Tellegen, in press). The full MPQ is an omnibus index of normal
personality traits consisting of 11 primary scales and 3 higher order factors. In order to
assess the personality trait of fearfulness, the Harm Avoidance scale from the MPQ was
used. The Harm Avoidance scale consists of 28 questions on which an individual must
either choose which of two presented scenarios are preferable to engage in, or confirm or

35

deny that they would like to engage in a singularly presented scenario. Internal reliability
for this scale is acceptable at .76 (Patrick, Curtin and Telligen, 2002).
Go-No-Go passive avoidance task. Go-No-Go task. Following Newman and
colleagues’ methods, participants were presented with 10 blocks of trials in which one of
ten, 2-digit numbers appeared alone on a computer screen. In each block, half (5) of the
numbers were positive stimuli that rewarded the participant for a response (rewarded by
winning 10 cents) and the other half punished the participant for a response (punished by
losing 10 cents). Within each block, the order of the stimuli were controlled such that no
more than three consecutive rewarding or punishing stimuli were presented. The task of
the participant was to press a button only when a rewarding stimulus was on the
computer screen and to withhold responding when a punishing stimulus was presented on
the screen. The trials began with an unrecorded practice session consisting of ten
consecutive rewarded stimuli. This practice session existed to promote operant
conditioning of a button pushing response set. After the practice block, the recorded
portion of the task began. Participants were presented with all trials and it was up to
them to decide whether to respond to the presented stimuli. Further, the participants had
an appropriate number of poker chips (representing 10 cents each) placed in front of them
or taken away from them to make salient how much money they were winning or losing
for each response they gave. White chips were placed in front of each participant to
show how much had been won at any point in the task. When any participant lost enough
to come to the point of being under 0 cents, then red poker chips (also representing 10
cents each) were placed in front of the participant to show how much had been lost for
the responses given.
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Modified Go-No-Go passive avoidance task. In order to determine if increasing
the frequency and intensity of punishment reduced the commission of passive avoidance
errors by those in the primary psychopathy group, the Go-No-Go task as described above
was modified. As with the usual version of the task, 10 blocks of trials were presented
which contained 10 stimuli per block. The task also still presented 10 stimuli (half of
which were rewarded and half of which were punished for responding to) to participants.
Unlike the normal version of this task, the frequency and intensity of the presentation of
the punishing stimuli increased across the 10 blocks of trials. To begin with, the
participants were again given an unrecorded practice session consisting of ten
consecutive rewarded stimuli. After the practice session, the recorded portion of the task
began. In the case of this modified task, the first 4 presented blocks proceeded as normal
with this task. That is, half of the stimuli presented were rewarded and half were
punished for responses. Further, on each of these first 4 trials, participants were punished
by losing 10 cents for each improper press of the response button. To increase the
frequency and intensity of punishment, the next 3 trials (5th through 7th) presented
rewards only 30% of the time with the punishment for each improper pressing of the
response button increased to 20 cents. To further increase the frequency and intensity of
punishment, the final 3 trials (8th through 10th) presented no rewarding stimuli at all and
punishment for each improper pressing of the response button was increased to 30 cents.
As with the normal version of the Go-No-Go task, participants were presented with all
trials and it was up to them to decide on their own how often to respond to the presented
stimuli. Also, as with the normal Go-No-Go task, participants had an appropriate number
of white or red poker chips (representing 10 cents each) placed in front of them or taken
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away from them to make salient how much money they were winning or losing for each
response they gave.
Card playing perseveration task. Following Newman's methods (Newman,
Patterson and Kosson, 1987), participants were presented with a series of trials in which a
series of 100 cards were presented face down (and one at a time) on a computer screen.
Some of the cards were rewarding stimuli and some were punishing stimuli. The trials
were presented beginning with a practice block of ten trials, in which all stimuli
presented were rewarding stimuli. Following this practice block, 10 blocks were
presented in which the percentage of potentially rewarding stimuli decreased by 10%
with each block starting with 90% in the initial block (i.e. 9 out of the first 10 were
rewarding, then 8 out of the next 10 and so on). The blocks ended with 0% of the stimuli
being presented being rewarding stimuli.
Participants were rewarded with 10 cents for each press of a button which
revealed a rewarding stimuli (a winning card was turned up) and were punished by losing
10 cents for every press of a button which revealed a punishing stimulus (a losing card
was turned up). Participants were informed that during the course of the task, after each
stimulus was presented, they were allowed to press a button to either continue onwards
with the task, and see if the next card was a winner or loser, or to press a different button
to quit the task immediately. They were also informed that the task did not include a
standard deck of cards so that they could not predict how many of each card would
appear. The objective was to record how far through the deck different types of
individuals would continue to play before they either choose to end the task or they ran
out of the 100 cards to play through. Objectively, once the 50% point of rewarding and
punishing stimuli per block was reached, it was no longer advantageous to continue to
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play the game. As with the Go-No-Go task, the participants had an appropriate number
of white or red poker chips (representing 10 cents each) placed in front of them or taken
away from them to make salient how much money they were winning or losing for each
response they gave.
Procedure
Recruitment and consenting procedures. With approval from DACCO, a sign up
sheet was made available to clients of the residential drug treatment program so that
those with interest in participating or finding out more about the study could voluntarily
sing up to have the researcher speak to them later about participating in the study. One at
a time, the researcher introduced himself to each individual whose name was on the list,
and if the potential participant reported continued interest in the study, then the
researcher privately sat down with the potential participant and determined if all
eligibility requirements were met. Informed consent was obtained using procedures
approved by the University of South Florida Institutional Review Board. If the potential
participant met eligibility criteria then the researcher described the study in greater detail
and had the interested individual fully read the consent form and discuss its contents. If
after reading over and discussing the consent form, the potential participant was still
interested in participating, then they were asked to sign the consent form and were then
considered an enrolled participant in the study.
Protocol. After the study began, the enrolled participant was brought to a private
room inside DACCO for the experiment. The study began with the use of the cognitive
dissonance attitude measure to determine the participant's attitudes on a specific topic.
As mentioned earlier, this measure had 10 items, however, only one of the ten was a
critical item on which attitude change was expected to been detected after the cognitive

39

dissonance manipulation had been completed. All of the other nine questions were
designed to be distracter items. Once the attitudes measure was completed, the
participant completed the LOT-R and MPQ-HA on paper, and completed the
computerized card task on a laptop computer.
Following these tasks, the participant took part in the dissonance induction task.
For this task, the participant was given a piece of paper containing three short statements
of equivalent length and compositional structure. Participants were asked to choose
which of the three statements they felt made the best argument for a topic and then to
copy their choice of the "best" argument onto another piece of paper. With the assistance
of DACCO personnel, the specific content of all three of the statements to choose from
were designed such that they would have a very high likelihood of being counterattitudinal to those who were receiving services at DACCO. Before the participant chose
and copied a statement from the given list, they were asked to not write their name on the
paper, thus leaving themselves anonymous in the end. Once the statement had been
completely copied, the participant was asked to tear up and throw away the paper they
just wrote on. Once this was done, the cognitive induction task was over. Following this
task, the participant filled out the cognitive dissonance attitude measure again to
determine if there had been any attitude change on the critical item due to the cognitive
dissonance induction.
Next they completed the WAS, SRPS, and BIS/BAS scales. Across participants,
the LOT-R/MPQ-HA and WAS/SRPS/BIS/BAS questionnaires were administered in a
counter-balanced order (pre or post the cognitive induction task) in an effort to reduce the
possibility of order effects for these measures. Lastly, the computerized Go-No-Go and
modified Go-No-Go tasks were completed. The participants were informed prior to
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beginning the computerized tasks that the person with the highest combined scores from
these tasks would receive an extra $20 from the experiment. This was done in an effort
to increase the degree of cognitive engagement by the participants regarding their
performance on the computerized tasks. Once the participant completed these computer
tasks, the freedom of choice question was given to confirm that the participant felt free to
choose what to write on in the cognitive induction task. When this was completed, the
experiment was over and the participant was paid $10 (into their institutional account at
DACCO) for their time and effort.
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Analysis Plan
Clustering Technique
Cluster analysis was used in an effort to identify groups of individuals with
profiles on clustering variables that most closely fit the characteristics of primary and
secondary psychopathy. This type of analysis has successfully been used in previous
studies to understand psychopathy and its subtypes (Hicks et al., 2004). Model-based
clustering was conducted with a computer package called MCLUST (Fraley, 1998).
Model-based clustering is designed to analyze the data and estimate the number of
subpopulations and then assign each individual to a subpopulation using cluster
algorithms. Then, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Fraley and Raftery, 2003)
is used to evaluate the fit of each model produced by the algorithms.
In MCLUST, the BIC value represents the goodness of fit of any of the models
that are created by the program. The BIC balances this goodness of fit with parsimony in
each model and the better fitting models will have less negative BIC values associated
with them (Raftery, 1995). By rule of thumb, models that have BIC values that differ by
more than 6 from the best fitting model are not considered to be viable for explaining the
relations of the data. For example, a BIC difference of 10 would indicate that the least
negative BIC value has a 150:1 chance of being the better fitting model for the data
(Raftery, 1995). On the other hand, a model that has a BIC value that differs by 6 has a
20:1 chance (20:1 being equivalent to p = .05) of being the better fitting model for the
data (Raftery, 1995). Therefore, cluster solutions within 6 BIC values of the best fitting
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model are considered viable and the appropriateness of each of those solutions should be
evaluated based on the predictions of relations between variables from prior theory.
The variables used to cluster participants into groups for this study consisted of
factor or subscale scores from the SRPS, BIS, BAS, and MPQ-HA measures that have
theoretically prescribed associations that have previously been shown to help
differentiate individuals into primary or secondary psychopathic experimental groups. It
was determined before the start of this study that should any of the MCLUST analyses
with these measures yield a multi-group solution that included groups with profiles
consistent with the theoretical profiles for primary, secondary and a non-psychopathic
group, then hypothesis testing would proceed as detailed below with participants
separated into the 3 groups (primary, secondary and non-psychopathic) as formed by the
clustering technique.
It was further decided that should the MCLUST techniques not produce a multigroup solution as expected, then the formation of primary, secondary and nonpsychopathic groups would proceed in a similar fashion as Newman and colleagues have
used in the majority of their studies. Newman's method has been to group individuals
based on their scores on a psychopathy measure and an anxiety measure. Newman has
taken those who both score at or above the cut off of 30 on the PCL-R and also score
below the median on an anxiety measure (usually the WAS) and labels that group "low
anxiety psychopaths" (which is analogous to primary psychopaths). He then takes those
who score both above the cut off of >30 on the PCL-R and also score above the median
on the anxiety measure and labels that group "high anxiety psychopaths" (which is
analogous to secondary psychopaths). Anyone who scores below 20 on the PCL-R is
considered non-psychopathic.
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Due to the highly intensive and time consuming nature of the PCL-R, a brief selfreport measure of psychopathy was used. When the need arose to create groups based on
scores from a single psychopathy measure (as Newman has done in the past), the SRPS
was used in combination with an accompanying anxiety measure (the WAS) to split the
sample into three different groups for hypothesis testing. For the purposes of this study,
those participants who scored > .5 standard deviations above the mean on the SRPS have
been considered psychopathic individuals. Greater than .5 standard deviations above the
mean was believed to be appropriate in capturing those with the requisite traits, since
recent studies have supported a dimensional construct rather than a categorical one which
may require a more extreme cut off.
Regardless of which method was used to create the groups for hypothesis testing,
the statistical tests used to test the hypotheses were conducted with variables other than
those used in the initial grouping of participants (i.e., the SRPS, BIS, BAS, and HA
scales). This was done in order to ensure that the grouping variables and criterion
variables were independent from one another.
Planned Statistical Analyses
Regarding hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) and their predictions about the performance
by members of the primary psychopathy cluster on passive avoidance tasks. A repeated
measures ANOVA was planned to determine if significant differences existed between
groups on the normal Go-No-Go task, as well as to determine if there was an interaction
between punishment intensity/frequency levels and group membership in regards to the
number of passive avoidance errors committed on the modified Go-No-Go task. To use a
repeated measures ANOVA, it was necessary to have one or more independent variables
(one of which must be within subjects) and one dependent variable. For this study, there
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existed three levels of punishment regarding the two Go-No-Go tasks. These levels of
punishment served as a within subjects independent variable in the repeated measures
design. Level one consisted of the normal Go-No-Go task as used in previous studies.
Level two consisted of the modified levels of punishment intensity/frequency when a
participant was punished 70% of the time and each punishment cost the participant 20
cents instead of the normal 10 cents. Level three consisted of the highest modified levels
of punishment intensity/frequency when a participant is punished 100% of the time and
each punishment cost the participant 30 cents instead of the previous 10 or 20 cents. This
study also contained a between groups independent variable, which was psychopathy
group membership (primary, secondary, non-psychopathic). Lastly, the dependent
variable measured for this analysis was the number of passive avoidance errors
committed on the two Go-No-Go tasks. The repeated measures ANOVA was proposed
to test hypothesis 1(a) by determining if there was a significant difference across the
between groups dependent variable at the first level of the Go-No-Go task. Hypothesis
1(b) was to be assessed through testing for an interaction between the within subjects
variable (levels of punishment intensity/frequency) and the between subjects variable
(psychopathy group) on the number of passive avoidance errors committed. A significant
interaction term for this analysis would be indicative of the presence of moderation
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). Specifically, it was expected that those in the primary
psychopathy group would show a reduction in the number of passive avoidance errors as
the intensity and frequency of punishment increased, while the number of passive
avoidance errors from the other two groups would remain statistically unchanged.
Regarding hypothesis (2) and its prediction about participant's degree of attitude
change in response to a dissonance induction protocol. Orthogonal planned comparisons
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utilizing a one-way ANCOVA (with pre cognitive dissonance induction attitudes serving
as the covariate) were utilized to determine if a significant difference in attitudes existed
between the primary psychopathy group, the secondary psychopathy group and the nonpsychopathic group after completing the cognitive induction task.
Regarding hypothesis (3) and its prediction regarding group differences in
optimism as measured by the LOT-R. A t-test was used to determine whether the mean
score for the primary psychopathy group was significantly higher on the LOT-R than that
of the secondary psychopathy group.
Regarding hypothesis (4), that optimism would mediate between primary
psychopathy and the number of errors of commission. For this analysis, participants were
no longer be grouped according to clustering techniques described earlier. Participant's
scores on the SRPS were used to determine the extent to which they showed primary
psychopathic traits. Further, statistical methods outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986)
were used to test for mediation in this predicted relation. Optimism (as measured by the
LOT-R) would be considered to have been a mediator if the following were met: (a)
variations in the level of primary psychopathy significantly accounted for variations in
optimism, (b) variations in optimism significantly accounted for variations in the number
of cards played (i.e. passive avoidance errors), (c) variations in level of primary
psychopathy significantly accounted for variations in number of cards played, (d) after
controlling statistically for optimism, a previously significant relation between level of
primary psychopathy and number of cards played was no longer significant. In order to
statistically test for relations (a) thru (d), three regression equations were to be conducted.
First, optimism was to be regressed onto primary psychopathy. Second, number of cards
played (i.e. passive avoidance errors) was to regressed onto primary psychopathy. Third,
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number cards played was to be regressed onto optimism followed by primary
psychopathy. If primary psychopathy affected optimism in the first equation and primary
psychopathy affected number of cards played in the second equation and primary
psychopathy affected number cards played less in the third equation than in the second
equation, then mediation by optimism will have been shown to exist.
Statistical Power
Sample size was determined by considerations of statistical power as described by
Cohen (1988). Regarding hypotheses 1a and 1b, a repeated measures ANOVA was
planned for use to analyze the data. With an pre-study estimated medium effect size of
.25, and a p level of .05, a sample size of 52 participants would have been required to
give a power of .80 to detect a difference between group means for this analysis.
Regarding the second hypothesis, a one-way ANCOVA was to be utilized to analyze the
data. With a pre-study estimated medium effect size of .25, and a p level of .05, a sample
size of 52 participants would have been required to give a power of .80 to detect a
difference between group means for this ANCOVA analysis. Regarding the third
hypothesis, t-tests were planned for use to analyze the data. With a pre-study estimated
medium effect size of .40 for t-tests, and a p level of .05, a sample size of 100
participants would have been required to give a power of .80. Regarding the fourth
hypothesis utilizing regressions to determine mediation, by rule of thumb, using 3
independent variables in a simultaneous regression equation would require 74
participants to achieve a power level of .8. The number of variables being entered at any
one time for the regression analyses being used to analyze the fourth hypothesis
(mediation by optimism) was to have been no more than 3, which means that the analysis
for this hypothesis would not require more participants to reach a power level of .8, than
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did hypothesis two. Lastly, using a simple rule of thumb, it was expected that 150
participants would have been required to create sufficiently stable groups (based on the
MCLUST technique) in order to produce reliable outcomes from the hypothesis testing.
Therefore, since this analysis demanded the most participants, 150 participants were
recruited to achieve pre-study estimates of appropriate power for all planned analyses.
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Results

MCLUST Outcomes
Responses to the SRPS, BIS, BAS and HA scales were used to attempt to cluster
participants into discrete groups. For analyses, the data from these measures were
converted into Z-scores, and once in Z-score form, the data was ready for MCLUST
analyses. Optimal cluster solutions were selected according to BIC criterion (described
earlier). The patterns of mean Z-scores on clustering variables for the emergent groups
were then examined to determine if they included profiles consistent with the theoretical
profiles for primary and secondary psychopathic individuals.
Several MCLUST analyses were conducted in an attempt to identify groups
whose profiles were plausibly interpretable as representing primary and secondary
psychopathy. Initially all participants were included in cluster analyses that used various
plausible combinations of the above variables (see Table 1 for examples of plausible
combinations used) that would potentially lead to groupings of cases that should fit
theory regarding personality profiles of primary and secondary psychopathy. However,
none of these analyses yielded cluster solutions that included group profiles that
adequately matched the theory-based a priori profiles for psychopathy subtypes as
previously detailed in Figure 1.
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Table 1
Examples of Plausible Combinations of Clustering Variables Used in MCLUST Analyses
________________________________________________________________________
-SRPS total score, HA total score
-SRPS total score, HA total score, BIS, BAS
-SRPS total score, HA total score, BIS, BAS-Drive, BAS-Reward Responsiveness
-SRPS total score, HA total score, BIS, BAS-Fun
-SRPS -Primary scale, SRPS -Secondary scale, HA total score
-SRPS -Primary scale, SRPS -Secondary scale, HA total score, BIS, BAS

Figure 1
Theory-Based A Priori Profiles for Psychopathy Subtypes

Primary

Secondary

Non-Psychopathic

High

Middle

Low

SRPS-P

SRPS-S

HA

BIS
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BAS-R

BAS-DR

BAS-F

WAS

Therefore, a secondary clustering strategy was employed. First, the sample was
split into two parts by using a cut score of .5 standard deviations above the mean on the
total score for the psychopathy measure (SRPS). Those individuals who scored below
this cut score were then considered to be non-psychopathic. Those with SRPS total
scores > .5 standard deviations above the mean were defined as psychopathic and their
responses on the clustering measures were subjected to the same MCLUST procedures as
before. Unlike the initial cluster analyses that utilized all subjects, with this new sample,
it was no longer necessary to find a three-group solution to create the groups for later
analyses of the study hypotheses. What was needed at this point was a solution that
included at least two groups, whose cluster variable profiles, when plotted using mean Zscores, approximately matched the a priori profiles that represent primary and secondary
psychopathy.
The subsequent MCLUST results yielded a single solution that best fit the data
according to BIC criteria and which had aspects which approximately fit a priori theory
regarding psychopathy when scores on criterion variables were plotted using Z-scores
(see Figure 2). Of the various plausible combinations of the above variables that were
used, this solution used scores from the primary and secondary SRPS scales and the HA
scale to identify the clusters.
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Figure 2
Results of MCLUST Analysis
P = Primary
S = Secondary
N = Non-Psychopathic
1.5

Cluster variables

Hold out variables

1
0.5
0
-0.5
-1
-1.5

srps-p srps-s

ha

p 0.927 0.819 -1.02
s 0.857 0.611 0.71
n -0.553 -0.472 0.066

bis

bas-r bas-dr bas-f

was

-0.057 0.061 0.561 0.716 0.393
0.199 0.273 0.252 0.278 0.316
-0.042 -0.074 -0.254 -0.287 -0.221

Further details about the outcome from the plotting of Z-scores using criterion
variables should be mentioned. As shown in Figure 2, the solution positioned those in
one cluster as highest on the primary and secondary scales of the SRPS (and well above
those in the non-psychopathic group). It also placed those in this same cluster much
lower on the HA scale than either those in the other cluster or those in the previously
carved out non-psychopathic group. Plots also indicated that those in the cluster with the
highest primary SRPS scores, had a weaker BIS than those in the other cluster. However,
the plots for the BAS scales were less clear in their theoretical support of this solution.
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The BAS reward responsiveness subscale agreed with prior theory, however, scores for
the BAS drive and fun subscales were more elevated for the cluster that was highest on
the SRPS scale. Overall though, Figure 2 shows that the profiles for the two groups
which contained participants who were .5 standard deviations above the mean on the
SRPS scale were an imperfect match to prior theory as to what would be expected of
primary and secondary psychopathic groups. Although the fit to prior theory was not
perfect, there appeared to be enough similarity (i.e., one group high on fearfulness and
the other low as Lykken contended) to move forward with testing the study hypotheses.
For testing the hypotheses, the cluster that is highest on the SRPS scale will be labeled
the primary psychopathy group, and the other group created by the clustering solution
will be labeled the secondary psychopathy group. Finally, the group with SRPS scores
less than .5 standard deviations above the mean was designated the non-psychopathic
group. Due to the imperfect fit of the MCLUST groupings, groups were also formed and
analyzed according to the built in back up strategy (i.e., Newman’s method) for testing
hypotheses.
Participant Characteristics
Data was collected from 150 male participants at a local residential drug
treatment agency. Characteristics that were assessed included: age, race, education level,
and criminal history (i.e., convictions of misdemeanors and felonies, and number of times
sent to prison). Table 2 details the demographic characteristics for the total sample as
well as for the two psychopathic and one non-psychopathic group formed after utilizing
the MCLUST program.

53

Table 2
Participant Characteristics
Total
(N=150)
Age (years)
Mean (SD)
32.8(9.6)
Race/Ethnicity
White
59%
Black
26%
Hispanic
15%
Education
< high school
55%
If < high school,
have GED? (%yes) 51%
High school diploma
31%
At least some
college
14%
Criminal history
% convicted of
past misdemeanors
83%
# of misdemeanor
convictions
Mean (SD)
3.2(3.5)
% convicted of
past felonies
82%
# of felony
convictions
Mean (SD)
3.5(5.6)
% sent to prison
for a past crime
29%
# times in prison
Mean (SD)
.68(1.5)

Non-Psychopathic
(N=93)

Primary
(N=27)

Secondary
(N=30)

33.1(9.6)

32.9(10.4)

31.7(9.9)

59%
26%
15%

70%
15%
15%

50%
36%
14%

52%

52%

67%

50%
32%

50%
37%

52%
22%

16%

11%

11%

80%

85%

89%

2.9(3.2)

4.3(4.7)

3.2(3.3)

80%

89%

82%

3.2(5.5)

3.5(3.4)

4.6(7.5)

26%

30%

36%

.65(1.6)

.56(1.2)

.92(1.8)

Demographic Analyses
The demographic responses from members of all three groups were compared
using ANOVA and chi-square analyses to determine if there were significant differences
in their responses (see Tables 3-5). None of the ANOVA analyses reached a
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conventional significance level of .05 (age: F (2,143) = .21, p = .81; # of misdemeanors:
F (2,140) = 1.64, p = .20; # of felonies: F (2,141) = .54, p = .58; # of times in prison: F
(2,142) = .46, p = .63). Further, for the categorical variables (race, education level)
neither of the chi-square analyses reached a traditional level of significance (race: χ2 (1,
N = 147) = 3.31, p = .51; education: χ2 (1, N = 147) = 2.88, p = .58). These results
indicate that the groups formed by the MCLUST procedure did not differ significantly
from each other on demographic characteristics. Therefore, any differences that might be
found among these groups on other variables of interest should not be due to differences
on these demographic variables.
Table 3
Demographic Analyses
Non-Psychopathic
Primary
Secondary
Variable
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
F
df
p
Age
33.1 (9.6)
32.9 (10.4)
31.7 (9.9) .21
2,143 .81
# of misdemeanor
convictions
2.9 (3.2)
4.3 (4.7)
3.2 (3.3) 1.64
2,140 .20
# of felony
convictions
3.2 (5.5)
3.5 (3.4)
4.6 (7.5) .54
2,141 .58
# of times in prison
.65 (1.6)
.56 (1.2)
.92 (1.8) .46
2,142 .63
________________________________________________________________________
Table 4
Demographic Analyses (Race)
Variable
Non-psychopathic
Primary
Secondary

White
%

Black
%

Hispanic
%

59%
70%
50%

26%
15%
36%

15%
15%
14%
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2

χ
2
χ = 3.31, p = .51

Table 5
Demographic Analyses (Education Level)

Variable
Non-psychopathic
Primary
Secondary

At least
< High school High school some college
%
%
%
χ2
χ2 = 2.88, p = .58
52%
32%
16%
52%
37%
11%
67%
22%
11%

Analyses of Study Hypotheses2
Hypothesis 1(a) and 1(b). Due to the fact that both parts of hypothesis 1 (1(a) and
1(b)) were tested by a repeated measures ANOVA, their results will both be discussed
together. Part 1(a) of hypothesis 1 predicted that when engaging in a passive avoidance
task, members of the primary psychopath group would commit significantly more passive
avoidance errors than would either members of the secondary psychopath group or those
in the non-psychopathic group. This would serve as a conceptual replication of much of
the previous work on this topic, as well as setting up the necessary condition to test
hypothesis 1(b). Part 1(b) of hypothesis 1 predicted that punishment frequency and
intensity would act to moderate the number of passive avoidance errors for members of
the primary psychopath group. Specifically, at higher levels of intensity and frequency
of punishment, members of the primary psychopathy group were expected to show

2

Using boxplots produced by SPSS’ “explore” function, the data set was checked for the
presence of outliers. The resulting boxplots indicated that the data sets used for hypotheses 1
and 3 did contain outliers. Consequently, the statistical analyses for these two hypotheses were
conducted both with and without the outliers present in the data sets. The resulting analyses
were not changed by retaining or eliminating the outliers from the analyses (i.e., a non-significant
result did not change to become significant and vice verse). Therefore, the results presented are
with outliers retained in the data sets.
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significantly reduced levels of passive avoidance errors as compared to their own level of
passive avoidance errors when frequency and intensity of punishment was lower.
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there were
significant differences between groups at either time period, within groups across time, or
in the interaction between groups across time. For part 1(a) of hypothesis 1 to receive
support, the between groups part of this analysis must be significant. The results from
this ANOVA showed that there were no differences among the three groups regarding the
number of passive avoidance errors that were committed during the Go-No-Go or the
Modified Go-No-Go tasks (F (2,137) = .78, p = .46) (see Table 6 for means and standard
errors).
Table 6
Outcomes for Hypothesis 1
Variable
Go-No-Go

Non-Psychopathic
M (SE)
4.1 (.12)

Primary
M (SE)
4.1 (.21)

Secondary
M (SE)
3.8 (.22)

Modified-Go-No-Go 2.7 (.17)
3 (.3)
2.5 (.31)
________________________________________________________________________

To assess the validity of part 1(b) of hypothesis 1, the interaction term of the
repeated measures ANOVA was also examined. For part 1(b) to be supported, the
interaction must be significant. The interaction between the within factors variable and
the between subjects variable was not significant (F (2,137) = .55, p = .58).
Lastly, the multivariate within subjects analysis was also examined. The results
showed that there was a significant difference within groups regarding the number of
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passive avoidance errors committed across the two tasks (Go-No-Go and Modified GoNo-Go) (F (1,137) = 96.1, p < .01) (see Figure 3).
Figure 3
Mean Errors of Commission by Group on Go-No-Go and Modified Go-No-Go Tasks
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These results indicate that neither part of hypothesis 1 was supported by the data
collected in this study. However, there was a significant drop in the commission of
passive avoidance errors found within all 3 groups across the two tasks.
A post hoc repeated measures ANOVA was conducted that combined subject’s
responses across the two tasks (Go-No-Go and Modified Go-No-Go). Because the first 4
trials of the Modified Go-No-Go are identical to the standard trials of the Go-No-Go task,
the reward contingencies for subjects are the same and these trials can be conceived, for
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analytic purposes, as an extension of the Go-No-Go task. Now the second part of the
within subjects factor consisted of all 3 trials that involved the first incremental increase
in the severity and frequency of punishment in the Modified Go-No-Go task, and the
third part of the within subjects factor consisted of all 3 trials that involved the second
increase in the severity and frequency of punishment in the Modified Go-No-Go task.
The results from this second ANOVA showed that there were no differences between the
three groups regarding the number of passive avoidance errors that were committed
during the any of the three new Go-No-Go task groupings (F (2,137) = .41, p = .66) (see
Table 7 for means and standard errors).
Table 7
Re-Analysis of Outcomes for Hypothesis 1
Variable
Go-No-Go

Non-Psychopathic
M (SE)
4.6 (.14)

Primary
M (SE)
4.7 (.25)

Secondary
M (SE)
4.2 (.26)

Modified-Go-No-Go (first increase in punishment severity and frequency)
1.4 (.12)
1.5 (.21)
1 (.21)
Modified-Go-No-Go (second increase in punishment severity and frequency)
1.1 (.12)
1.1 (.21)
1.4 (.22)
________________________________________________________________________
To again assess the validity of part 1(b) of hypothesis 1, the interaction term of
the repeated measures ANOVA was examined. This interaction was significant (F
(4,274) = 4.31, p < .01). Lastly, the multivariate within subjects’ outcomes were also
analyzed. The results showed that there was also a significant difference within groups
regarding the number of passive avoidance errors committed across the 3 new Go-No-Go
task groupings (F (2,136) = 466.85, p < .01) (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4
Mean Errors of Commission by Group on Traditional Go-No-Go Trials, Modified GoNo-Go L1 (First Increase in Intensity and Severity of Punishment) and Modified Go-NoGo L2 (Second Increase in Intensity and Severity of Punishment)
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Evaluation of hypothesis 1 within-subjects contrasts. Due to the fact that there
were multiple levels of the within subjects’ factor for this analysis, the specific contrast
effects can be examined. The results of the repeated measures ANOVA indicate that
there was an interaction between the within subjects factor and the between groups
factor. An examination of the contrasts was therefore necessary to determine the nature
of the interaction and whether it supported part 1(b) of hypothesis 1. The contrasts
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showed that the significant group by task interaction occurred only when the errors
committed between the two modified portions of the Go-No-Go were considered (F (2,
137) = 8.25, p < .01) (see figure 4). An examination of the marginal means showed that
whereas those in the primary and non-psychopathic clusters continued to lower the
number of passive avoidance errors as the frequency and severity of punishment
continued to increase, those in the secondary psychopathy cluster actually increased the
number of errors that they committed from the first increase in punishment to the second
and most extreme increase in punishment. While this is an interesting post hoc finding, it
does not do anything to change the lack of support for part 1(b) of hypothesis 1.
Although neither the between groups effects, nor the closer examination of the
significant interaction effects supported either part of hypothesis 1, there was still found
to be a significant drop in the commission of passive avoidance errors found within all 3
groups across the 3 new stages of the tasks. Further analysis of the within subjects
contrasts indicated that the significant differences in commission of passive avoidance
errors was driven by a significant drop in the number of such errors between the regular
Go-No-Go task and the first increase in punishment severity and frequency (F (1,137) =
1029.88, p < .01) (see figure 4). There was no further decrease in the number of errors
within the groups when they proceeded from the first increase in punishment frequency
and severity to the second increase in punishment (F (1,137) = 1.21, p = .27).
Hypothesis 2. This hypothesis predicted that those in the primary psychopath
cluster would exhibit significantly less attitude change following a cognitive dissonance
induction task, than would those in either the secondary psychopath cluster or the nonpsychopathic cluster. The test of this hypothesis was conducted using orthogonal
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planned comparisons utilizing a one-way ANCOVA (with pre-cognitive dissonance
induction attitudes serving as the covariate).
Before proceeding with the ANCOVA, it was important to check for 2 conditions.
First, it had to be determined that there was no significant interaction between the
covariate (pre cognitive dissonance induction attitudes) and the independent factor
(group membership) on post cognitive dissonance induction attitudes. Analyses
indicated that there was no such relationship between these two variables (F (2,141) =
1.11, p = .80). Second, correlations between the covariate and the dependant variable
(post cognitive dissonance induction attitudes) were conducted to be sure that they were
linearly related as required for ANCOVA’s. The correlation between these two variables
was significant (r (145) = .58, p < .01).
The results of the ensuing ANCOVA analysis showed that there were no
significant differences in post cognitive dissonance induction attitudes among the 3
groups (F (2,143) = 2.19, p = .12) (see Table 8). Although there were no significant
differences among the 3 groups, the estimated means showed that those in the secondary
group were the highest (M = 6.8), with the non-psychopathic group in the middle (M =
6.0) and those in the primary group the lowest (M = 5.6). Further, responses on the
freedom to choose manipulation check were explored to determine if differences on this
measure may explain the results. As a whole, the sample had a mean of 7.44, which is
above the midpoint of the scale and represented feelings on the part of participants that
they felt free to choose the topic that they wrote on. Further, when assessed by group,
there were no differences on this measure (F (2, 144) = 1.27, p = .28) [Primary (7.11),
Secondary (8.25), Non-psychopathic (7.28)].
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Table 8
Outcomes for Hypothesis 2
Non-Psychopathic Primary
Secondary
Variable
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
F
df
p
Post cognitive
induction attitudes
6.0 (.23)
5.6 (.42)
6.8 (.41) 2.19 2,143 .12
________________________________________________________________________
Inspection of the data revealed that 14% of the sample had reported a predissonance induction attitude that was already at the ceiling of the measure used to assess
their attitudes. This situation makes it impossible for any of those 14% to show cognitive
dissonance since they cannot move any higher on the scale at post test than they had
already answered at pre-test. To determine if this problem negatively impacted support
for this hypothesis, the ANCOVA was run again after excluding this 14% from the
analyses.
As with the earlier analysis, the two important assumptions for ANCOVA’s had
to be checked. Analyses indicated that there was no interaction between the covariate
and the group factor (F (2,120) = .11, p = .89) on post cognitive dissonance induction
attitudes. Second, the correlation between the covariate and the dependant variable was
significant (r (122) = .58, p < .01).
The results of the ensuing ANCOVA analysis showed that there were still no
significant differences in post cognitive induction attitudes among the 3 groups (F
(2,122) = 1.54, p = .22) (see Table 9). Again, although there were no significant
differences between the groups, the estimated means were still in the same order as they
were for the previous analysis of this hypothesis (secondary group (M = 6.4), nonpsychopathic group (M = 5.7), primary group (M = 5.3)). Further, responses on the
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freedom to choose manipulation check were also explored without these 14%. As a
whole, the sample now had a mean of 7.36, which is above the midpoint of the scale and
represented feelings on the part of participants that they felt free to choose the topic that
they wrote on. Further, as before, when assessed by group, there were no differences on
this measure (F (2, 123) = .96, p = .38) [Primary (7.13), Secondary (8.12), Nonpsychopathic (7.18)].
Table 9
Re-analysis of Outcomes for Hypothesis 2
Non-Psychopathic Primary
Secondary
Variable
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
F
df
p
Post cognitive
induction attitudes
5.7 (2.5)
5.3 (4.6)
6.4 (4.4) 1.54 2,120 .22
________________________________________________________________________
Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis predicted that members of the primary psychopath
cluster would score significantly higher on the LOT-R than would those in the secondary
psychopath cluster. This hypothesis was tested using a t-test on the mean LOT-R scores
for the primary and secondary psychopathy groups. The results of this analysis indicate
that there was no difference between the two groups on their levels of optimism (t (53) =
-.47, p = .64) (see Table 10).
Table 10
Outcomes for Hypothesis 3
Primary
Secondary
Variable
M (SD)
M (SD)
t
df
p
LOT-R
19.2 (4.8)
19.8 (4)
-.47
53
.64
________________________________________________________________________
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Hypothesis 4. This hypothesis predicted that optimism, as measured on the LOTR, would mediate the relationship between primary psychopathy scores and the number
of errors of commission made on a card playing passive avoidance task. Because testing
this hypothesis involved a variable-level rather than a person-level analysis, participants
were no longer grouped according to the MCLUST solutions. To determine if this
hypothesis was supported, it would first have to have been shown that scores on the
primary psychopathy subscale of the SRPS, optimism and the number of errors of
commission were all significantly correlated with each other. Only if this condition was
met, would it be proper to move onto the next step of using regression equations to test
for mediation.
Results showed that the LOT-R was significantly correlated with scores on the
primary psychopathy subscale of the SRPS (r (147) = -.21, p < .01). This negative
association was contrary to what had been expected (i.e., a positive, not a negative
correlation between the LOT-R and the primary subscale of the SRPS was predicted).
Further analyses also showed that the LOT-R was not correlated with the number of
errors committed on the card playing task (r (147) = .05, p = .26), nor were scores on the
SRPS primary subscale correlated with the number of errors on the card playing task (r
(147) = -.02, p = .39) (see Table 11). Due to the fact that the first condition for testing
hypothesis 4 was not met (i.e., that all three variables be significantly related to each
other) there was no need to continue further by assessing the potential mediating effects
of optimism with regression analyses. The failure to find significant correlations
between the three variables indicates that hypothesis 4 was not supported in this study.
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Table 11
Correlation Outcomes for Hypothesis 4
________________________________________________________________________
SRPS Primary scale
# of cards played
LOT-R
-.21*
.05
SRPS Primary scale
-.02
* p <.01. N = 147.
Re-Formulation of Groups Using Newman’s Method
As mentioned earlier, the initial MCLUST analyses did not provide a usable 3
group solution (i.e., primary, secondary and non-psychopathic) to test the study
hypotheses. The previous analyses were conducted after clustering only those scoring
high on the measure of psychopathy, which yielded primary and secondary psychopathy
groups whose cluster variable profiles only partially matched theoretical expectations.
Thus, the original back-up strategy of following Newman’s methods for partitioning
individuals into one of the three experimental groups was also followed to determine if
different outcomes would be found in regards to testing the hypotheses. The following
analyses mirrored those previously conducted and detailed for the groups produced by
the MCLUST solution.
Participant Characteristics
Table 12 details the demographic characteristics for the total sample as well as for
the two psychopathic and one non-psychopathic group formed using the methods of
Newman and colleagues.
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Table 12
Participant Characteristics (Newman’s Method)
Total
(N=150)
Age (years)
Mean (SD)
32.8(9.6)
Race/Ethnicity
White
59%
Black
26%
Hispanic
15%
Education
< high school
55%
If < high school,
have GED? (%yes) 51%
High school diploma
31%
At least some
college
14%
Criminal history
% convicted of
past misdemeanors
83%
# of misdemeanor
convictions
Mean (SD)
3.2(3.5)
% convicted of
past felonies
82%
# of felony
convictions
Mean (SD)
3.5(5.6)
% sent to prison
for a past crime
29%
# times in prison
Mean (SD)
.68(1.5)

Non-Psychopathic
(N=93)

Primary
(N=17)

Secondary
(N=40)

33.1(9.6)

32.9(10.3)

32.1(10.1)

59%
26%
15%

63%
25%
12%

59%
26%
15%

52%

63%

59%

50%
32%

73%
31%

42%
28%

16%

6%

13%

80%

88%

87%

2.9(3.1)

4.5 (5.5)

3.4 (3.3)

80%

81%

87%

3.3(5.5)

5.4 (7.8)

3.4 (4.9)

26%

44%

28%

.66 (1.6)

1.1 (1.7)

.62 (1.4)

Demographic Analyses
The demographic responses from members of all three groups were compared
using ANOVA and chi-square analyses to determine if there were significant differences
in their responses (see tables 13-15). None of the ANOVA analyses were significant at
the .05 level (age: F (2,143) = .15, p = .87; # of misdemeanors: F (2,140) = 1.55, p = .22;
# of felonies: F (2,141) = 1.0, p = .4; # of times in prison: F (2,142) = .54, p = .59). Chi-
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square analyses for the categorical variables (race, education level) also did not reach a
.05 level of significance (race: χ2 (4, N = 147) = .11, p = .99; education: χ2 (4, N = 147) =
1.55, p = .82). These results indicate that the groups formed according to Newman’s
methods did not differ significantly from each other on demographic characteristics.
Therefore, any differences that might be found among these groups on other variables of
interest should not be due to differences on these demographic variables.
Table 13
Demographic Analyses (Newman’s Method)
Non-Psychopathic
M (SD)
33.1 (9.5)

Primary
M (SD)
32.9 (10.3)

Secondary
M (SD)
F
32.1 (10.1) .15

Variable
df
p
Age
2,143 .87
# of misdemeanor
convictions
2.9 (3.1)
4.5 (5.5)
3.4 (3.3) 1.6
2,140 .22
# of felony
convictions
3.3 (5.5)
5.4 (7.8)
3.4 (4.9) .97
2,141 .38
# of times in prison
.66 (1.6)
1.1 (1.7)
.62 (1.4) .54
2,142 .59
________________________________________________________________________
Table 14
Demographic Analyses (Race) (Newman’s Method)
Variable
Non-psychopathic
Primary
Secondary

White
%

Black
%

Hispanic
%

59%
63%
59%

26%
25%
26%

15%
12%
15%
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χ2
χ2 = .11, p = .99

Table 15
Demographic Analyses (Education Level) (Newman’s Method)

Variable
Non-psychopathic
Primary
Secondary

At least
< High school High school some college
%
%
%
χ2
χ2 = 1.55, p = .82
52%
32%
16%
63%
31%
6%
59%
28%
13%

Analyses of Study Hypotheses3
Hypothesis 1(a) and 1(b). Parts 1(a) and 1(b) of the first hypothesis will again be
discussed together. Again, for part 1(a) of hypothesis 1 to receive support, the between
groups part of a repeated measures ANOVA must be significant. As with the analyses of
the MCLUST groups, the results from this ANOVA showed that there were no
differences among the three groups regarding the number of passive avoidance errors that
were committed during the Go-No-Go or the Modified Go-No-Go tasks (F (2,135) = .30,
p = .74) (see Table 16 for means and standard errors). For part 1(b) to be supported, the
interaction term of the repeated measures ANOVA must be significant. The interaction
between the within factors variable and the between subjects variable was not significant
(F (2,135) = .59, p = .55). Lastly, the multivariate within subjects analysis was also
examined. The results showed that there was a significant difference within groups
regarding the number of passive avoidance errors committed across the two tasks (Go-

3

As with the MCLUST analyses, using boxplots produced by SPSS’ “explore” function, the data
set was checked for the presence of outliers. The resulting boxplots indicated that the data sets
used for hypotheses 1 and 3 did contain outliers. Consequently, the statistical analyses for these
two hypotheses were conducted both with and without the outliers present in the data sets. The
resulting analyses were not changed by retaining or eliminating the outliers from the analyses
(i.e., a non-significant result did not change to become significant and vice verse). Therefore, the
results presented are with outliers retained in the data sets.
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No-Go and Modified Go-No-Go) (F (1,135) = 98.48, p < .01) (see Figure 5). As was the
case with the groups as formed by the MCLUST procedure, these results indicate that
neither part of hypothesis 1 was supported. However, there was again a significant drop
in the commission of passive avoidance errors found within all 3 groups across the two
tasks.

Table 16
Outcomes for Hypothesis 1 (Newman’s Method)
Variable
Go-No-Go

Non-Psychopathic
M (SE)
4.2 (.12)

Primary
M (SE)
3.9 (.28)

Secondary
M (SE)
4 (.18)

Modified-Go-No-Go 2.7 (.17)
2.5 (.38)
2.8 (.26)
________________________________________________________________________
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Figure 5
Mean Errors of Commission by Group on Go-No-Go and Modified Go-No-Go Tasks for
Groups Created Through Newman’s Method
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A post hoc repeated measures ANOVA was again conducted using the combined
subject’ responses across the two tasks (Go-No-Go and Modified Go-No-Go) to produce
three levels of analysis for the Go-No-Go task. The results from this ANOVA again
showed that there were no differences between the three groups regarding the number of
passive avoidance errors that were committed during the any of the three newly formed
Go-No-Go task groupings (F (2,134) = .18, p = .84) (see Table 17 for means and standard
errors).
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Table 17
Re-analysis of Outcomes for Hypothesis 1 (Newman’s Method)
Variable
Go-No-Go

Non-Psychopathic
M (SE)
4.6 (.14)

Primary
M (SE)
4.3 (.38)

Secondary
M (SE)
4.4 (.22)

Modified-Go-No-Go (first increase in punishment severity and frequency)
1.4 (.12)
1.2 (.27)
1.2 (.18)
Modified-Go-No-Go (second increase in punishment severity and frequency)
1.1 (.11)
1.1 (.25)
1.2 (.17)
________________________________________________________________________
To assess part 1(b) of hypothesis 1 with this altered configuration of the Go-NoGo task, the interaction term of the repeated measures ANOVA was examined. This
interaction was not significant (F (4,268) = .63, p = .62). Lastly, the multivariate within
subjects’ outcomes were also analyzed. The results showed that there was a significant
difference within groups regarding the number of passive avoidance errors committed
across the 3 new Go-No-Go task groupings (F (2,133) = 414.02, p < .01) (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6
Mean Errors of Commission by Group on Traditional Go-No-Go Trials, Modified GoNo-Go L1 (First Increase in Intensity and Severity of Punishment) and Modified Go-NoGo L2 (Second Increase in Intensity and Severity of Punishment) for Groups Created
Through Newman’s Method
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Evaluation of hypothesis 1 within-subjects contrasts. With the groups formed by
the MCLUST procedure, an interaction was present, which upon examination was found
to indicate that those in the secondary psychopathy group increased their levels of
responding (i.e., committed more passive avoidance errors) in the final stage of the task
when they were being most frequently and intensely punished for responding incorrectly.
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No such interaction between group and level of the task was found for the groups as
formed through Newman’s method.
Although neither part of hypothesis 1 was supported, as with the previous
analyses using the MCLUST groupings, those in the primary group still showed a
significant drop in the commission of passive avoidance errors across the new 3 stages of
the Go-No-Go tasks. This significant reduction in the commission of passive avoidance
errors was again driven by a significant drop in the number of such errors between the
regular Go-No-Go task and the first increase in punishment severity and frequency (F
(1,134) = 731.40, p < .01) (see Figure 6). There was no further decrease in the number of
errors within the groups when they proceeded from the first increase in punishment
frequency and severity to the second increase in punishment (F (1,134) = 2.71, p = .10)
(see Figure 6).
Hypothesis 2. This hypothesis predicted that those in the primary psychopath
cluster would exhibit significantly less attitude change following a cognitive dissonance
induction task, than would those in either the secondary psychopath cluster or the nonpsychopathic cluster. The test of this hypothesis was again conducted using orthogonal
planned comparisons utilizing a one-way ANCOVA (with pre-cognitive dissonance
induction attitudes serving as the covariate).
As with the previous ANCOVA analysis, 2 important conditions were necessary
to confirm. Analyses indicated that there was no interaction between the covariate and
the independent factor (F (2,141) = .06, p = .94). Second, correlations between the
covariate and the dependant variable (post cognitive dissonance induction attitudes) were
conducted to ensure that they were linearly related as required for ANCOVA’s. The
correlation between these two variables was significant (r (145) = .58, p < .01). The
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resulting ANCOVA showed that there were no significant differences in post cognitive
dissonance induction attitudes among the 3 groups (F (2,143) = .20, p = .82) (see Table
18). The responses on the freedom to choose manipulation check were again explored.
As before, the sample mean was still 7.44 since this does not split groups in any way.
Again, this shows that participants felt free to choose the topic that they wrote on. There
were no differences on this measure (F (2, 144) = .42, p = .66) [Primary (8.00),
Secondary (7.56), Non-psychopathic (7.28)] when participants were assigned to groups
by Newman’s method.
Table 18
Outcomes for Hypothesis 2 (Newman’s Method)
Non-Psychopathic Primary
Secondary
Variable
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
F
df
p
Post cognitive
induction attitudes
6.1 (.23)
6.0 (.56)
6.3 (.36) .20 2,143 .82
________________________________________________________________________
As with the previous MCLUST groupings, to determine if the 14% of the
participants who were at the ceiling of the attitude measure at time 1 negatively impacted
support for this hypothesis, the ANCOVA was run again after excluding this 14% from
the analyses. As with the earlier analysis, the two important assumptions for ANCOVA’s
had to be checked. Analyses indicated that there was no interaction between the
covariate and the group factor (F (2,120) = .11, p = .89) on post cognitive dissonance
induction attitudes. Second, the correlation between the covariate and the dependant
variable was significant (r (122) = .58, p < .01). The results of the ensuing ANCOVA
analysis again showed that there were still no significant differences in post cognitive
induction attitudes among the 3 groups (F(2,122) = .26, p = .77) (see Table 19). The
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responses on the freedom to choose manipulation check were again explored without
these 14%. As before, without this 14%, the whole sample now had a mean of 7.36,
which represents that participants felt free to choose the topic that they wrote on.
Further, as before, when assessed by group, there were no differences on this measure (F
(2, 123) = .34, p = .71) [Primary (7.71), Secondary (7.62), Non-psychopathic (7.18)].
Table 19
Re-analysis of Outcomes for Hypothesis 2 (Newman’s Method)
Non-Psychopathic Primary
Secondary
Variable
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
F
df
p
Post cognitive
induction attitudes
5.7 (.25)
5.5 (.59)
6.0 (.38) .26 2,122 .77
________________________________________________________________________
Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis predicted that members of the primary psychopath
cluster would score significantly higher on the LOT-R than would those in the secondary
psychopath cluster. Unlike the results with the MCLUST groupings, the results of this
analysis indicated that there was a significant difference between the two groups on their
levels of optimism (t (45) = 2.86, p < .01) (see Table 20). Inspection of the group means
confirmed the hypothesis that those in the primary psychopathy group showed more
optimism (M = 21.9), than did those in the secondary group (M = 19.1). [While this does
support the hypothesis, it is not surprising that when groups are created by utilizing
differing levels of anxiety (i.e., high vs. low) as a grouping factor, that they would then
also be significantly different on their levels of optimism. This is due to the fact that
research (Campbell & Kwon, 2001; Lewis & Kliewer, 1995; Scheier, Carver & Bridges,
1994) has previously shown that optimism is significantly and negatively correlated to
anxiety (i.e., those high on anxiety like secondary psychopaths would also likely be low
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on optimism and vice verse for primary psychopaths).] Because of the relationship
between optimism and anxiety, a post hoc ANCOVA was conducted with anxiety as the
covariate to determine if the primary and secondary groups differed on optimism when
anxiety is controlled for. Prior to conducting the ANCOVA, it was determined that the
covariate (anxiety) was indeed correlated with the dependent variable (optimism) (r (55)
= -.25, p < .05). The results indicated that there was no longer a difference between the
groups after anxiety was controlled for (F (1, 52) = .02, p = .89).
Table 20
Outcomes for Hypothesis 3 (Newman’s Method)
Variable
LOT-R

Primary
M (SD)
21.9 (2.3)

Secondary
M (SD)
19.1 (4.6)

t
2.86

df
45

p
.01

Hypothesis 4. Because the analysis of this hypothesis was to be conducted with
regressions and did not rely on participants being partitioned into groups, the outcome for
this analysis would be no different from the previous analysis of hypothesis 4.

77

Discussion
General Discussion of Results
The present study was designed to investigate issues regarding the psychopathy
construct that are as of yet still poorly understood. There are practical necessities in
better understanding this construct due to the great degree of trouble that individuals with
high degrees of psychopathy can cause society. Understanding what makes highly
psychopathic individuals as they are may help society better deal with them once they are
identified. Hopefully understanding the etiology of the problem may lead to the
development of interventions to keep people from ever becoming highly psychopathic in
the first place. For example, following from previous research and theorizing by Lykken
(1995) it would be expected that many individuals with a fearless temperament are at
higher risk to develop psychopathic traits than are those who have more normal levels of
fearfulness. Understanding this etiological link to developing higher levels of
psychopathy led Lykken (1995) to theorize that the type of parenting that a relatively
fearless child gets will have an influence on whether that child can be successfully
socialized. Therefore, through attempting to understand the etiology of the construct as
Lykken did, it may be possible to propose ways to attempt to disrupt the course of
fearless youths towards developing psychopathic traits and antisocial behaviors.
The current study attempted to add to the research base regarding the construct of
psychopathy in two ways. First, it sought empirical confirmation of various patterns of
personality traits suggested by theory to identify different types of psychopathic
individuals. This was accomplished by clustering the participants into discrete groups
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using various trait measures (i.e., anxiety, fearfulness, behavioral inhibition and
activation, etc.) that have previously been hypothesized to help distinguish between
primary and secondary psychopaths and comparing the emergent profiles to the
theoretical ones.
Second, this study tested four hypotheses that were designed to expand the base
of knowledge regarding the psychopath construct by exploring a number of situations in
which subtypes of psychopaths were expected to show different responses to
experimental manipulations. Theoretical subtypes were expected to differ in terms of (1)
number of passive avoidance errors and (2) responses to increases in frequency and
intensity of punishment on a passive avoidance task, (3) perseverance on a card playing
task, and (4) attitudinal change in response to a cognitive dissonance task. Further, the
role of a previously untested construct (positive expectancies) in regards to subtyping
psychopaths was also explored.
Regarding the empirical confirmation of theoretical subtypes, there was only
partial correspondence between the group profiles that emerged through MCLUST and
those suggested by prior theory regarding the psychopathy construct. Whereas prior
theorizing by Lykken (1995) and Fowles (1980) posit that clustering a sample of
offenders on measures of psychopathy, fearlessness, and behavioral inhibition and
activation should lead to distinct groupings of psychopathic individuals (i.e., primary,
secondary and non-psychopathic), in this study, it was only when the most psychopathic
individuals (those who were .5 standard deviations above the mean on the SRPS) were
separated from the larger group and then clustered on psychopathy and fearlessness that
usable groups emerged. Even so, when Z-scores were plotted for these groups on the
hold out variables (i.e., bis, bas, anxiety) the profiles only weakly fit prior theory as to the
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mean strength of each group on these traits relative to the other groups. This lead to
testing the study hypotheses using both these imperfect groupings produced using
MCLUST and secondly, using alternative groupings created through using Newman’s
more traditional method based on elevated psychopathy scores and a median split on a
measure of anxiety.
Regardless of the method used to parse the sample into putative psychopathic
sub-groups, in general the results were unsupportive of the hypotheses examined (unless
specifically stated, the following comments will pertain to the results from both
methods).
Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) proposed that compared to the other experimental
groups, primary psychopaths would commit a significantly higher number of passive
avoidance errors on a successive Go-No-Go task, and that this difference in commission
of errors by the primary group could be eliminated by increasing the frequency and
intensity of punishment given during the task. This state of affairs did not occur exactly
as hypothesized a priori.
Although it was found that primary psychopaths were indeed responsive to
increases in punishment frequency and intensity across the Go-No-Go and modified GoNo-Go tasks, there were no differences among the experimental groups in terms of the
number of errors of commission (passive avoidance errors) during the Go-No-Go part of
the task (which violates an assumption of part 1a of the hypothesis). This finding of no
difference between groups in terms of passive avoidance errors on the Go-No-Go task is
contrary to the majority of the previous work on this topic (Arnet, Howland, Smith, &
Newman, 1993; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman et al., 1990; Patterson, Kosson &
Newman, 1987), although this is not the only study to find such a result (Howard,
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Payamal & Neo, 1997) and it is unknown how many other null findings may never have
been published. Further, the finding in the present study that rates of responding by those
in the primary psychopathy group were reduced in response to increases in punishment
frequency and intensity is consistent with findings previously reported by Blair et al.
(2004).
Even though the responses given by those in the primary group on the standard
version of the Go-No-Go did not turn out as predicted, the fact that primary psychopaths
were responsive to changes that occurred as they progressed into the modified Go-No-Go
part of the task suggests that they are indeed capable of noticing changes in the demands
of a task even after a response set consisting of a high responding has been previously
set. Further, as part of one of the other study hypotheses, perseveration on a card-playing
task was also explored. On this task, there were also no differences among groups on
how far through a deck of cards participants would play regardless of the change in
payoffs that occurred as participants played further through the deck. This too is contrary
to what others have previously found (Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987) and indicates
that primary psychopaths, as identified in the two methods in the present study, may not
differ from controls and secondary psychopaths in their ability to notice changing
contingencies.
These findings relating to passive avoidance and perseveration in psychopaths,
are contrary to the response modulation hypothesis as proposed by Newman and
colleagues (Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987; Newman,
Widom & Nathan, 1985). The response modulation hypothesis states that low anxious
(i.e., primary) psychopaths are unable to notice changing payoffs in reward/punishment
and perseveration tasks due to a deficiency in their ability to perform brief and automatic
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shifts in attention. These shifts in attention would allow them to monitor cues peripheral
to their current tasks that would inform them to change their current dominant response
set (Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987; Newman, Widom &
Nathan, 1985).
The present finding suggests a number of possibilities regarding the response
modulation hypothesis of Newman and colleagues. First, it may be that they are
completely incorrect in their thinking as to why primary psychopaths commit more
passive avoidance errors than do secondary or non-psychopaths. However, based on the
large amount of empirical support that they have developed so far, it seems more likely
that they are instead partially correct in their hypothesis. As stated in the introduction for
this study, there was a need to further test the responses of psychopathic individuals in a
broader range of contexts than had previously been done. In doing so in this study, it
may have been shown that the response modulation hypothesis is no longer supported
when peripheral cues to a task are of sufficient strength or frequency. Therefore, this
study’s results put into question the degree to which primary psychopaths have difficulty
in learning reward/punishment based contingencies as well as whether these same
individuals really do suffer from an inability to automatically shift focus from a dominant
task as the response modulation hypothesis from Newman and colleagues would contend.
The second hypothesis predicted that primary psychopaths would not show as
much attitude change as those in the other two groups after a cognitive dissonance
induction procedure. This was predicted due to previous literature that indicated that
psychopaths, especially those with primary psychopathic features, are less
physiologically responsive (i.e., decreased levels of arousal, emotional responses) to
negatively laden stimuli (Patrick, 1994; Patrick, Bradley & Lang, 1993). If this is true,
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then attitude change due to the effects of cognitive dissonance (which has been shown to
be produced most strongly by negatively laden arousal (Losch & Cacioppo, 1990))
should not occur in this group, or at least should be quite deficient in comparison to the
other groups. The results to the ANCOVA analyses showed that there was no difference
in the degree of attitude change across the three groups. This was true even though the
secondary and non-psychopathy groups showed significant time 1-time 2 changes in
attitudes whereas those in the primary group showed no significant change across time.
A further examination of the results showed that even though there was no
significant degree of attitude change for the primary group, there was still movement in
attitudes from time 1 to time 2, which evidently was enough to keep the attitudes between
groups from being significantly different from each other at time 2. An examination of
the effect sizes of the primary and secondary psychopathy groups revealed that the
secondary group had a larger effect size (MCLUST method (.51); Newman’s method
(.40)) that turned out to be approximately twice the size of that from the primary group
(MCLUST method (.16); Newman’s method (.21)). This indicates that the primary group
was much less responsive to the manipulation than were those in the secondary group.
However, since the primary group’s effect size was not zero, this also indicates that those
in this group did have some response to the task and that this should serve as support for
the notion that they are partly deficient rather than being completely devoid of the ability
to produce arousal to negatively affective stimuli.
The third hypothesis was designed to explore the potential of a construct new to
psychopathy research to help explain differences in the behavior of primary and
secondary psychopaths. A wealth of previous research revealed that associations with
positive (or negative) expectancies (or optimism as specifically used in this study)
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parallel those with primary and secondary psychopathy across a wide variety of criterion
variables; this research suggests that primary psychopaths should hold optimistic
attitudes, whereas secondary psychopaths should hold pessimistic attitudes (see
appendices A and B for citations). When this hypothesis was tested however, it was
found that those in the primary group were not only not more optimistic than those in the
secondary group as was predicted, but were also less optimistic than those in the nonpsychopathic cluster.
To attempt to clarify what scores on the LOT-R may mean, it has been proposed
that the scale can be divided into two subscales (one purported to measure only optimism
and the other to measure only pessimism) (Chang, Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1997).
When the groups derived using MCLUST and Newman’s method were compared on
these separate subscales, it was found that (as with the LOT-R total scores) primary and
secondary psychopaths did not statistically differ from each other on either the optimism
or pessimism subscales of the LOT-R. However, when all psychopathic individuals were
combined together into one group, it was found that they did differ from the nonpsychopathic group in terms of having statistically higher scores on the pessimism
subscale. This seems to indicate that compared to non-psychopathic individuals, that
psychopaths have an equivalent ability to feel optimistic about life situations, but tend to
be more amenable to pessimism when the opportunity arises as well.
The final hypothesis predicted that primary psychopaths would persist further
through a deck of cards than would other groups and that this behavior would be
mediated by high optimism. Those in the primary psychopathy group did not on average
play further through the deck of cards than those in the other groups, nor (as was just
mentioned above) were they more optimistic on average than those in the other two
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groups. A comparison of results from a previous card playing study using a highly
comparable paradigm (Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987) shows that the mean number
of cards played by those in the non-psychopathic groups is comparable across studies (68
cards played in the current study and 63 cards played in the comparison study).
However, the average number of cards which were played by those in the psychopathy
groups was much lower in the current study as compared to the previous study by
Newman et al. In the current study, those in the primary group played an average of 65
cards and those in the secondary group played an average of 60 cards (total when the two
groups were combined into one group was 62). Newman et al. (1987), did not separate
his psychopathic participants into subtype groups and as such, he found that his
psychopathic group played an average of 90 out of the 100 cards in the deck before
stopping. This is clearly much higher than the average 62 cards that were played in the
present study when combining the two psychopathic groups into one group. Therefore,
the results from this study indicate that non-psychopaths were declining to continue
through the deck of cards at a very similar point in both studies, yet the psychopathic
individuals in the present study were declining to continue at a point much earlier than in
the previous work by Newman et al. (1987).
Study Limitations
The present study has limitations that may have hindered the hypotheses being
adequately supported. Because one of the interests of this research was to replicate a
previous study that had examined rewards/punishments and Go-No-Go tasks, it was
decided to use the same self-report measure of psychopathy that had been previously
used in that study (Brinkley, Schmitt, Smith & Newman (2001); Lynam, Whiteside and
Jones (1999)). The decision to use the same self-report measure was made in order to
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hold steady what otherwise would have been a major source of variation between the
studies when trying to compare their results. However, a limitation of using the same
self-report measure (the SRPS) is that the SRPS may have some difficulty in discerning
between primary and secondary types of psychopaths (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). In
two studies, it has been found that the SRPS factor which purports to assess primary
psychopathic characteristics relates highly to scales on other measures which assess
secondary psychopathic characteristics. Sometimes the SRPS primary scale even relates
to these other secondary scales more highly than with the primary scales of the same
measures (i.e., with the two scales of the PPI for instance) (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006).
For instance, Lilienfeld, Skeem, and Poythress (2004) found that the primary subscale of
the SRPS was correlated at .62 with PPI-II, which is associated with secondary features,
and only .16 with PPI-I, which is associated with primary psychopathy features. Further,
Brinkley et al., 2001, found that the primary scale of the SRPS was correlated as strongly
(.31) with factor 2 of the PCL-R as with factor 1 (.30). This cross contamination of
secondary psychopathic features in the SRPS’s primary scale makes it harder to correctly
divide groups into relatively ”pure” primary and secondary groups and could limit the
ability to find differences between the groups on dependent variables.
A second limitation is that the participants for this study come from a group that
resides at a residential drug treatment program rather than a prison as is the case for most
of the prior research conducted with psychopaths and especially in regards to
psychopaths and their performance on passive avoidance and perseveration tasks. While
it is true that a great majority of the participants in this study have been arrested in the
past (123 of the participants have been arrested for committing past felony crimes) and
29% have spent at least some time in prison. It is then also true that 71% have never
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been sent to prison for their past criminal behaviors. Therefore, even though it is
possible to be quite psychopathic yet manage to avoid being sent to prison, it is also
likely that the individuals in this study (mostly individuals who have never been to
prison) were not as psychopathic (at least on the secondary scale) as those in prior
studies. If this is true, then the responses on the passive avoidance and perseveration
tasks would not be expected to be as persistent as would be predicted based on a
literature which heavily depends on the outcomes from more psychopathic individuals.
Another limitation is that since the construct of positive expectancy had not yet
been explored in relation to psychopathy, it is entirely possible that optimism was not the
ideal way to conceptualize positive expectancies as they relate to psychopathy and its
subtypes. It may be the case that another measure of the positive expectancy construct
(i.e., hope) would have been more effective in showing the theorized relations.
Another limitation is that the monetary incentive provided for the participants to
play the Go-No-Go, modified Go-No-Go, and card playing tasks was minimal and not
guaranteed. Prior to completing the tasks, participants were notified that a single award
of $20 would be given to the one participant who attained the highest combined scores
across the tasks. Because the monetary incentive was small, distant and not guaranteed,
it is possible that participants were only minimally engaged in performing the tasks. This
is problematic because without being properly engaged in the tasks, the differences
between the primary psychopaths and the non-psychopaths are less explainable as a
failure of Newman’s response modulation theory. This is because this theory contends
that it is a lack of an ability to momentarily disengage attention from a task to see
changing contingencies that differs between primary psychopaths and others. If the
primary psychopaths were never really engaged in the task in the first place, then it is not
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unexpected that they could see the changing contingencies and perform just as well as
those from the other groups, which is what the results showed.
Still regarding the passive avoidance and perseveration tasks, it is not known to
what degree the participants discussed these tasks among themselves and may have
provided strategies (either willingly or unwittingly) to future participants that helped
them perform better than they may otherwise have done. This especially pertains to the
card playing task in which the average number of cards played for all three groups were
quite similar in regards to the point at which they stopped playing through the deck of
cards. This is again contrary to Newman’s research, which has found that primary
psychopathic individuals played much further than those in the other two groups. It
could be that those who might otherwise have played further through the deck if they
were naïve to the procedure (i.e., those in the primary group) heard about a winning
strategy (i.e., only play about half of the cards) and performed better because of this.
Lastly, resource limitations precluded the use of the PCL-R as the measure of
psychopathy and contemporaneous recording of physiological responses from the
participants to the tasks that they took part in. Utilizing physiological measures (such as
skin conductance levels, or cardiac impedance) would have been helpful in determining if
there were differences in physiological reactivity between groups when they were
engaged in the cognitive dissonance task as well as when they were responding to the
stimuli on the Go-No-Go style tasks and the card playing task. It may be the case that
physiological differences would be significant where differences on self-report measures
or game playing tasks were not.
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Future Directions for Psychopathy Research
First, it seems desirable to continue to conduct research on psychopathy selfreport measures to facilitate greater study of the construct. Even though the PCL-R is
often considered the measure of choice to best assess psychopathy in offender
populations, its undeniable time and resource intensive nature makes it difficult for all
researchers to use. Expending more effort to perfect self-report measures (such as the
new PPI-R by Lilienfeld, (2005) may help the field move towards being able to more
precisely assess psychopathy and its subtypes. The development of valid self-report
psychopathy measures may allow research to move more easily into many situations that
couldn’t be explored before due to time constraints, or limited access to appropriate
records.
Second, regarding expanding the subject base on which psychopathy research has
traditional been conducted, recent research indicates that psychopathy is more likely a
dimensional construct rather than a taxonic one (Marcus, John & Edens, 2004; Edens,
Markus, Lilienfeld & Poythress, 2006). Thus, it seems appropriate to conduct more
research using participants from populations which are not incarcerated in prisons and
other non-offender samples. To conduct research with populations in less “locked down”
criminal offender facilities and even the general public at large would inform the field
regarding how individuals with differing levels of psychopathy behave. For example, it
would be beneficial to understand how the somewhat psychopathic, yet successful
individual behaves relative to a more criminally involved psychopaths and what
underlying aspects of psychopathy makes them different.
Lastly, with the wealth of psychophysiological methods available today, it is
surprising that the majority of work isn’t being done on this construct with such
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measures. This is especially true given the importance that contemporary theories of the
construct place on a biological root. For example, Newman’s position that anxiety has a
strong role in differentiating between types of psychopaths could be tested by drug
blockade studies or any paradigm that assesses activity of the sympathetic nervous
system (chiefly through using cardiac impedance to determine preejection period (PEP)
in response to arousing events). Further, if Newman is correct in his response
modulation theory, that psychopaths get so focused on tasks that they can’t shift attention
to notice peripheral cues regarding changing rates of payoffs, then perhaps some sort of
acoustic oddball task could be set up to test that theory in a psychophysiological manner.
Overall, the results from this study did not support the hypotheses as stated a
priori. However, these negative findings do not provide sufficient basis for discarding
the hypotheses because of concerns about the specific measures used in this study. It
may still be fruitful to test these hypotheses using other, better validated measures of
psychopathy or other key constructs (e.g. hope versus optimism) as suggested herein.
Further exploration along these lines may result in new knowledge about the potential for
primary psychopaths to change their goal driven behavior in response to changing
contingencies and to the nature of the relationship between positive expectancies and
psychopathy subtypes. These findings are important because only through such
continued exploration of the construct can psychopathy be understood to the point where
society may be able to manage the behaviors of these troubling individuals.
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Appendix A
Relation to high optimism

Variable

Relation to Primary Psychopathy

Negative correlation

Anxiety

Negative correlation

Cites: Scheier, Carver & Bridges,

Cites: Harpur et al., 1989; Hare,

1994; Lewis & Kliewer, 1995;

1991; Patrick, 1994; Smith &

Raikkonenet al., 1999; Campbell &

Newman, 1990; Verona et al., 2001.

Kwon, 2001; Kwon, 2002.
Negative correlation

Neuroticism

Negative correlation

Cites: Scheier, Carver & Bridges,

Cites: Harpur et al., 1989; Hare,

1994; Mascaro, Rosen & Morey, 2004.

1991; Widiger & Lynam, 1998;
Verona et al., 2001; Miller et al.,
2001.

Negative correlation

Negative Affect

Negative correlation

Cites: Kashani et al., 1997; Lucas,

Cites: Patrick, 1994; Verona et al.,

Diener & Suh, 1996; Raikkonen et al.,

2001; Benning et al., 2003; Patrick

1999; Chang & Sanna, 2001.

et al., 2003.

Positive Correlation

Narcissism

Positive Correlation

Cites: Hickman, Watson & Morris,

Cites: Harpur et al., 1989; Reiss,

1996.

Grubin & Meux, 1999; McHoskey,
Werzel & Szyaro, 1998.
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Appendix A: (Continued)
Positive Correlation

Positive Affect

Positive Correlation

Cites: Patrick, 1994.

Cites: Kashani et al., 1997; Lucas,
Diener & Suh, 1996; Raikkonen et al.,
1999; Chang & Sanna, 2001.
Positive Correlation

Success/

Positive Correlation

Achievement
Cites: Currey, Snyder et al., 1997;

Cites: Verona et al., 2001; Benning

Snyder, Hoza et al., 1997; Snyder,

et al., 2003.

Michael & Cheavens, 1999.
Positive Correlation

Planning

Positive Correlation

Cites: Hart and Dempster, 1997.

Cites: Snyder et al, 1991; Scheier,
Carver & Bridges, 1994; Irving et al.,
2004.
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Appendix B
Relation to high optimism

Variable

Relation to Secondary
Psychopathy

Negative correlation

Anxiety

Positive Correlation

Cites: Scheier, Carver & Bridges,

Cites: Harpur et al., 1989; Hare,

1994; Lewis & Kliewer, 1995;

1991; Patrick, 1994; Levenson,

Raikkonenet al., 1999; Campbell &

Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995;

Kwon, 2001; Kwon, 2002.

Blackburn, 1998; Verona et al.,
2001.

Negative correlation

Neuroticism

Positive Correlation

Cites: Scheier, Carver & Bridges,

Cites: Harpur et al., 1989; Hare,

1994; Mascaro, Rosen & Morey, 2004.

1991; Widiger & Lynam, 1998;
Lynam, Whiteside & Jones, 1999;
Verona et al., 2001.

Negative correlation

Negative Affect

Positive Correlation

Cites: Kashani et al., 1997; Lucas,

Cites: Patrick, 1994; Verona et al.,

Diener & Suh, 1996; Raikkonen et al.,

2001; Benning et al., 2003; Patrick

1999; Chang & Sanna, 2001.

et al., 2003.

Negative correlation

Suicide behavior

Positive Correlation

Cites: Verona et al., 2003.

Cites: Meadows & Kaslow, 2002;
Kaslow et al., 2002.
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Appendix B: (Continued)
Negative correlation

Substance Abuse

Positive Correlation

Cites: McCauley Ohannessian et al.,

Cites: Smith & Newman, 1990;

1993; Scheier, Carver & Bridges,

Hemphill, Hart & Hare, 1994;

1994; Carvajal, Clair, Nash & Evans,

Reardon, Long & Patrick, 2002;

1998; Grunbaum et al., 2000; Carvajal,

Benning et al., 2003.

Evans, Nash & Getz, 2002; Willinger
et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2002;
Bolland, 2003.
Positive Correlation

Planning

Negative correlation

Cites: Snyder et al, 1991; Scheier,

Cites: Lillienfeld & Andrews,

Carver & Bridges, 1994; Irving et al.,

1996; Hart and Dempster, 1997.

2004.
Positive Correlation

Conscientiousness

Negative correlation

Cites: Widiger & Lynam, 1998;

Cites: Mascaro, Rosen & Morey, 2004.

Lynam, Whiteside & Jones, 1999.
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Appendix C

Demographic Questionnaire

What is your birthday? __________________ (MM/DD/YY)
Which best describes the racial/ethnic group you belong to? (circle one below)
Caucasian/White

African American/Black

Marriage status (circle one): Single

Married

Hispanic/Latino
Divorced

Separated

What was the last grade in school that you completed?_____________________
If you did not finish high school, do you have a GED?_________
Have you ever been convicted of a misdemeanor crime?
If yes to above, how many times has this happened?______________
Have you ever been convicted of a felony crime?
If yes to above, how many times has this happened?______________
Have you ever been sent to prison for a crime?
If yes to above, how many times has this happened?______________

How many times have you been arrested?_________________
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Appendix D
Attitudes Questionnaire
1. The crime that I am in trouble for should not carry the degree of punishment that it
does.
1
Strongly
Agree

2

3
4
Somewhat
Agree

5
6
7
Slightly Slightly
Agree Disagree

8
9
Somewhat
Disagree

10
Strongly
Disagree

2. The court system made a fair and correct decision in my case.
1
Strongly
Agree

2

3
4
Somewhat
Agree

5
6
7
Slightly Slightly
Agree Disagree

8
9
Somewhat
Disagree

10
Strongly
Disagree

3. The judicial system is biased against minorities and the poor.
1
Strongly
Agree

2

3
4
Somewhat
Agree

5
6
7
Slightly Slightly
Agree Disagree

8
9
Somewhat
Disagree

10
Strongly
Disagree

4. In the future, people who commit crimes should not get the breaks I have had.
1
Strongly
Agree

2

3
4
Somewhat
Agree

5
6
7
Slightly Slightly
Agree Disagree

8
9
Somewhat
Disagree

10
Strongly
Disagree

5. I think that most people in trouble with the law got themselves there.
1
Strongly
Agree

2

3
4
Somewhat
Agree

5
6
7
Slightly Slightly
Agree Disagree

8
9
Somewhat
Disagree

10
Strongly
Disagree

6. Since I am not in jail/prison, I don't think I should have a probation officer watching
me.
1
Strongly
Agree

2

3
4
Somewhat
Agree

5
6
7
Slightly Slightly
Agree Disagree

8
9
Somewhat
Disagree

10
Strongly
Disagree

8
9
Somewhat
Disagree

10
Strongly
Disagree

7. Most crime has something to do with drugs.
1
Strongly
Agree

2

3
4
Somewhat
Agree

5
6
7
Slightly Slightly
Agree Disagree
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Appendix D: (Continued)
8. Since I am forced to be here, I should not have to pay for the services I receive.
1
Strongly
Agree

2

3
4
Somewhat
Agree

5
6
7
Slightly Slightly
Agree Disagree

8
9
Somewhat
Disagree

10
Strongly
Disagree

9. People who commit crimes should not be able to avoid jail/prison time.
1
Strongly
Agree

2

3
4
Somewhat
Agree

5
6
7
Slightly Slightly
Agree Disagree

8
9
Somewhat
Disagree

10
Strongly
Disagree

10. A person's childhood experiences have a lot of effect on their adult behaviors.
1
Strongly
Agree

2

3
4
Somewhat
Agree

5
6
7
Slightly Slightly
Agree Disagree
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8
9
Somewhat
Disagree

10
Strongly
Disagree

Appendix E
Writing Assignment
Below are 3 paragraphs to choose from. We would like you to give each one a quick
read and then choose the 1 that you feel makes the best argument for its point.
Then copy that 1 paragraph that you like the best onto the other blank piece of
paper. Please do not put your name on the paper that you write on and copy what is
written exactly as it is on this paper.

I think that too many people who get into trouble with the law are allowed to get off easy
for too long. Research has shown that many people who break the law had received light
punishments for years before they were in big trouble. Many who have broken the law
repeatedly said that they never changed because they had gotten off light many times
before and they never felt they were going to get into any real trouble. I think that if
people would be punished early on with out getting off light, that they would learn their
lesson earlier in life and not cause so much trouble later on. I don’t think that the justice
system should give breaks to those who break the law.

I think that those who break the law should have to do their part to help pay part of the
costs of their trial, jail time, probation etc. Research shows that the prosecution and
supervision of those who commit crimes costs this country more each year. If money
that was put into criminal justice was put into something else, then people who were in
need could be helped. I think that it just makes sense for those who commit a crime to be
the ones who pay for the process to be played out and for all the post-incarceration costs
such as probation too. I think that if people did more to pay for the costs of their actions
that maybe they would have a better sense of what they were costing society.

I think that those who have committed crimes in the past should have law enforcement
keeping an eye on them for a while in the future. Research has shown that those who
commit one crime are likely to commit another one in the future. Many of those who
have not been under the supervision of someone like a probation officer have felt free to
commit crimes again. I think that individuals like probation officers serve a real purpose
in making sure that those who have gone wrong in the past will not be as likely to go
wrong again in the future. I think that society is better off when offenders on probation
have someone watching over them until they are off probation.
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Appendix F

Date: _________________

SRPS
Listed below are a number of statements. Each represents a commonly held opinion and
there are no right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree with some items and
agree with others. Please read each statement carefully and circle the number which
best describes the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement, or the
extent to which each statement applies to you.
Item
1. Success is based on survival of the
fittest; I am not concerned about the
losers.
2. For me, what’s right is whatever I can
get away with.
3. In today’s world, I feel justified in doing
anything I can get away with to succeed.
4. My main purpose in life is getting as
many goodies as I can.
5. Making a lot of money is my most
important goal.
6. I let others worry about higher values;
my main concern is with the bottom line.
7. People who are stupid enough to get
ripped off usually deserve it.
8. Looking out for myself is my top
priority.
9. I tell other people what they want to
hear so that they will do what I want
them to do.
10. I would be upset if my success came at
someone else’s expense.
11. I often admire a really clever scam.
12. I make a point of trying not to hurt
others in pursuit of my goals.
13. I enjoy manipulating other people’s
feelings.
14. I feel bad if my words or actions cause
someone else to feel emotional pain.
15. Even if I were trying very hard to sell
something, I wouldn’t lie about it.

Disagree
Strongly
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Disagree
Somewhat

Agree
Somewhat

Agree
Strongly

1

2

3

4

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

Appendix F: (Continued)
Disagree
Strongly
16. Cheating is not justified because it is unfair
1
to others.

Item

17. I find myself in the same kinds of
trouble, time after time.
18. I am often bored.
19. I find that I am able to pursue one goal
for a long time.
20. I don’t plan anything very far in
advance.
21. I quickly lose interest in tasks I start.
22. Most of my problems are due to the
fact that other people just don’t
understand me.
23. Before I do anything, I carefully
consider the possible consequences.
24. I have been in a lot of shouting
matches with other people.
25. When I get frustrated, I often "let off
steam" by blowing my top.
26. Love is overrated.
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Disagree
Somewhat
2

Agree
Agree
Somewhat Strongly
3
4

1

2

3

4

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

1

2

3

4

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

Appendix G
LOT-R
Please be as honest and accurate as you can throughout. Try not to let your response to
one statement influence your responses to other statements. There are no "correct" or
"incorrect" answers. Answer according to your own feelings, rather than how you think
"most people" would answer. To answer a question put the letter corresponding to the
answer you wish to give on the line next to each question. For example, if your answer
to a question is “A” meaning “I agree a lot”, then put an “A” on the line to the right of
that question, and so forth.
A = I agree a lot
B = I agree a little
C = I neither agree nor disagree
D = I DISagree a little
E = I DISagree a lot
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
_________
2. It's easy for me to relax.
_________
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will.
_________
4. I'm always optimistic about my future.
_________
5. I enjoy my friends a lot.
_________
6. It's important for me to keep busy.
_________
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way.
_________
8. I don't get upset too easily.
_________
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me. _________
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad. _________
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Appendix H
Attitudes Towards Situations Questionnaire
These items are statements that you might use to describe your opinions and feelings
regarding various situations. For each item you should circle either T or F. The meaning
of these two possible answers is given below.
T = Definitely or Probably true
F = Definitely or Probably false
So if the statement is definitely or probably true for you, then you should circle T. If the
statement is definitely or probably false for you, then you should circle F.
Other items contain two statements marked A or B. For these items you should circle
either A or B for your answer. The meaning of these two possible answers is given
below.
A = Definitely or Probably A
B = Definitely or Probably B
(1) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Running a steam presser in a laundry for a week
(B) Being caught in a blizzard
(2) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Being in a bank when suddenly three masked men with guns come in and
make everyone raise their hands
(B) Sitting through a two-hour concert of bad music
(3) It might be fun and exciting to experience an earthquake
T
F
(4) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Attempting to beat a railroad train at a crossing
(B) Spraining my ankle so that I can’t walk on it
(5) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Standing in line for something
(B) Getting an electric shock as part of a medical experiment

121

Appendix H: (Continued)
(6) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Balancing along the top rail of a picket fence
(B) Walking up four flights of stairs
(7) I might enjoy riding in an open elevator to the top of a tall building under
construction
T
F
(8) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Walking a mile when it’s 15 degrees below zero
(B) Being near when a volcano erupts
(9) I would not enjoy fighting a forest fire
T
F
(10) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Having to walk around all day on a blistered foot
(B) Sleeping out on a camping trip in an area where there are rattlesnakes
(11) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Having a pilot announce that the plane has engine trouble and that he may
have to make an emergency landing
(B) Working in the fields digging potatoes
(12) It would be fun to explore an old abandoned house at night
T
F
(13) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Being out on a sailboat during a great storm at sea
(B) Having to stay home every night for two weeks with a sick relative
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Appendix H: (Continued)
(14) I would enjoy trying to cross the ocean in a small but seaworthy sailboat
T
F
(15) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Riding a long stretch of rapids in a canoe
(B) Waiting for someone who’s late
(16) It might be fun to walk a tightrope
T
F
(17) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Being in a circus when two lions suddenly get loose in the ring
(B) Bringing my whole family to the circus and then not being able to get in
because a clerk sold us tickets for the wrong night
(18) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Having to drive alone for a day and a half without stopping for sleep because
I stayed on my vacation too long
(B) Jumping from a third story window into a fireman’s net
(19) I would not like to try skydiving
T
F
(20) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Finding out my car was stolen when I don’t have theft insurance
(B) Riding a runaway horse
(21) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Being chosen as the “target” of a knife throwing act
(B) Being sick to my stomach for 24 hours
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Appendix H: (Continued)
(22) I like (or would like) to dive off a high board
T
F
(23) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Tying up a truck full of newspapers for a paper sale
(B) Seeing a tornado cloud moving toward me when I’m driving in the country
(24) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Being in a flood
(B) Carrying a ton of coal from the backyard into the basement
(25) I would enjoy learning to handle poisonous snakes
T
F
(26) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Realizing the ice is unsafe when I’m standing in the middle of a frozen lake
(B) Finding that someone has slashed all four of my tires
(27) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Being seasick every day for a week while on an ocean voyage
(B) having to stand on the ledge of the 25th floor of a hotel because there’s a fire
in my room
(28) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST:
(A) Burning my arm badly by leaning against a hot water pipe
(B) Swimming where sharks have been reported
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Appendix I
Written Assignment Questionnaire
Please answer the question below by circling a number on the scale below.
Earlier you were asked to write some sentences on a topic of your choosing. How free
did you feel to choose the topic that you wrote about?
0
1
Not at all
free to
choose

2

3

4

5

6
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7

8

9

10
Completely
free to
choose

Appendix J
BIS/BAS
Each item of this questionnaire is a statement that a person may either agree with or
disagree with. For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the
item says. Please respond to all the items; do not leave any blank. Choose only one
response to each statement. Please be as accurate and honest as you can be. Respond to
each item as if it were the only item. That is, don't worry about being "consistent" in
your responses.
1. If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked up."
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
2. I worry about making mistakes.
1
2
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat

3
4
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly

3. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
4. I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
5. Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or
nervousness.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
6. I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
7. I have very few fears compared to my friends.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
8. When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
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9. When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
10. When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
11. It would excite me to win a contest.
1
2
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat

3
4
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly

12. When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
13. When I want something I usually go all-out to get it.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
14. I go out of my way to get things I want.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
15. If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
16. When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
17. I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
18. I crave excitement and new sensations.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
19. I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun.
1
2
3
4
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
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20. I often act on the spur of the moment.
1
2
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat

3
4
Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly
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